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The Creation and Destruction of  
Price Cartels: An Evolutionary Theory 
William Bradford* 
I. INTRODUCTION
 Imagine a motorist, I. Ned Gass, who has lost his bearings and is 
sputtering down a dirt road toward the tiny town of Utopia, desperate to 
find a gas station as the fuel gauge on his rented car dips below empty and 
the engine begins knocking.  As he approaches the sole intersection, elation 
surges as through the dust the shapes of not one but two gas stations 
identical in all apparent respects and located directly across the road from 
each other come into view.  He scans back and forth between the signs for 
each station.  The first—operated by DeweyCheatham Oil—is charging 
$7.99 per gallon of regular unleaded.  The second—operated by EnHowe 
Oil—is charging the identical price.  His elation fades as he recalls that gas 
sells for $3.99 per gallon back in Big City.  Angry at this “price gouging” 
but bereft of options, I. Ned Gass wrestles the wheel toward the 
DeweyCheatham station and shudders to a stop at the first pump.  After he 
fills the tank and studies a map he speeds back out onto the road, retracing 
his route toward the interstate highway, muttering about “breaking up 
OPEC” and “Big Oil” and vowing to “throw the bums out” of Congress 
and the White House in the next election. 
* * *
The preceding scenario1 raises a number of questions.  Clearly, the 
two gas stations in Utopia are charging a significant price premium above 
the competitive price, but why are they able to do so?  How did they both 
arrive at the identical supracompetitive price?  Why doesn’t each station 
* Professor of Law, Law Section, Department of Humanities, United States Coast Guard
Academy, New London, Connecticut.  Ph.D., Northwestern University (1995); LL.M, Harvard Law 
School (2001).  The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily represent those of the United 
States Government, the Department of Homeland Security, or the United States Coast Guard. 
1. A scenario—a detailed hypothetical account of a sequence of fictional political, economic, and
legal events—is used to generate data and create a natural context for the heuristic analysis of theories, 
particularly in the field of law and economics.  See Carol Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
369, 369–70 (2010). 
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lower its price in order to attract all the business in Utopia?  Is it legal to 
charge a supracompetitive price?  If not, can supracompetitive pricing be 
remedied through law?  If it is legal, what if anything can and should the 
law do in response?  Whether it is legal or not, what entities—firms, 
consumers, government regulators, or others—are part of the optimal 
solution to the failure of a competitive market for gas in Utopia, and what 
rules, processes, and instrumentalities can they wield by way of a remedy? 
Part II of this Article will sketch the goals of antitrust law, describe 
the causes and effects of anticompetitive pricing generally and 
supracompetitive pricing specifically, explain the inability of antitrust law 
to suppress some instances of supracompetitive pricing, establish the 
importance of trust between firms as a necessary condition for 
supracompetitive pricing, and illustrate how the strategic exchange of 
information is crucial to the creation and destruction of trust and thus to the 
evolution and devolution of price cartels.  Part III will develop a positive 
theory2 that explains and predicts the evolution and devolution of price 
cartels as a function of the ability of rival firms to exchange information 
and, in turn, to enable the generation and sustenance of trust that 
cooperation in supracompetitive pricing decisions will be reciprocated. 
Part IV, followed by a Conclusion, extends the scenario supra and uses 
game theory as a heuristic to develop and test the proffered theory, posit 
working answers to and hypotheses regarding the questions supra, and 
discuss the implications for the creation, interpretation, and adjudication of 
antitrust law in the context of price cartels. 
II. INFORMATION, TRUST, AND THE CREATION AND
DESTRUCTION OF PRICE CARTELS 
A. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE, COMPETITION,
AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Earning a profit is not ipso facto a violation of law; quite the contrary: 
each firm is a legal fiction created by the state for the purpose of 
maximizing profits, and its continued existence depends upon how well it 
performs this function.3  To earn profit, a firm combines capital and labor 
to produce goods or services demanded by consumers and offers them for 
2.  A “positive” theory is distinct from a normative theory in that it attempts to state what is, and
not what ought to be, and thus is falsifiable.  JAMES N. ROSENAU, COMPARING FOREIGN POLICIES: 
THEORIES, FINDINGS, AND METHODS 17 (1972).  A positive theory includes a specification of constructs 
or concepts, a set of hypotheses, and criteria for explanation of behavior. 
3.  See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 126. 
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sale at the greatest price the market will bear—ideally, from the perspective 
of the profit-maximizing firm, as close to an infinite sum as possible.  In 
turn, consumers demand these goods and services to satisfy their needs and 
wants, but want to pay as little as possible—ideally, zero.  Where the 
market is characterized by many firms supplying a particular good or 
service, competition drives price down, expands output, and maximizes 
consumer surplus and social welfare.4  However, where only a single firm 
produces a given good or service, that firm is a natural monopoly that, “by 
keeping the market under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual 
demand, sell[s] [its] commodities above the natural price, and raise[s] [its] 
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their 
natural rate.”5  Thus consumers, as well as market regulators and public 
officials, have common interests not in suppressing profit per se but in 
preventing monopolization and its effects, which include diminished 
consumer surplus and social welfare resulting from reduced supply, 
supracompetitive prices, and supracompetitive profits.6 
B. ORIGINS OF ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Elimination of monopolies does not guarantee competitive prices,
however.  Multiple producers can also engage in self-interested cooperation 
that has anticompetitive effects.  Indeed, the intensity of competitive 
behavior in an industry is not fixed but “ranges from peaceful coexistence 
to all-out combat situations.”7  Because competition can trigger price wars 
that destroy producer surplus, many firms have evolved a “more dynamic 
relationship than the words ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’ suggest 
individually.”8  Rather than accept mutually destructive competition as 
ordained, some rivals—particularly large duopolists9—have evolved 
4. Tay-Cheng Ma, Bank-Firm Relationship as a Strategic Commitment in a Duopolistic
Environment, 3 J. COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 233, 241 (2007).  “Consumer surplus” is the product of (1) 
the difference between the maximum price consumers are willing to pay and the price they actually pay 
and (2) the total quantity purchased.  A detailed definition of “social welfare” is beyond the scope of 
this Article; it suffices to define the term as the aggregate or total wealth or income of a society, with 
maximization of social welfare implying the form of market that produces and allocates goods and 
services so as to maximize the real utility to the society it serves.  See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1 (2d ed. 1951). 
5. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 66 (1776). 
6. See AVINDASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 358–59 (2d ed. 2001) (detailing
the common interest of consumers and regulators in competitive prices that resulted in antitrust 
legislation). 
7.  Oliver P. Heil, George S. Day & David J. Reibstein, Signaling to Competitors, in WHARTON
ON DYNAMIC STRATEGY 280 (George S. Day, David J. Ribstein, & Robert E. Gunther ed., 2005). 
8.  ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 4 (1996). 
9.  See IRA WINKLER, CORPORATE ESPIONAGE 50 (1997) (noting that cooperation and market
partitioning behavior correlates with firm size and is greatest in the case of large duopolists). 
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relationships of leader-follower behavior, collusion, and even “de facto 
partitioning of the market” to ensure their peaceful coexistence.10  Under 
these arrangements, even the most self-interested rivals recognize that, by 
jointly setting prices higher than would obtain under competition, the 
welfare of each producer can be maximized, albeit at the expense of 
consumers.11 
C. ORIGINS OF ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act are designed to deter and punish 
monopolies as well as other anticompetitive practices such as collusive 
agreements to restrain output, fix prices, or allocate markets.12  
Accordingly, the legal regime governing antitrust has been designed to 
undo collusion and preserve for consumers the benefits of competitive 
markets—greater choice, more innovation, higher quality, and above all 
lower prices—by promoting competition.13  When impediments to 
competition are created by the coordinated strategies of firms, the state has 
the power and duty to intervene.  Antitrust analysis identifies and addresses 
anticompetitive practices by predicting the behavior of firm combinations 
under various market characteristics that bear upon the ability to charge 
higher prices than would prevail absent these combinations and 
characteristics, and by deterring or punishing predicted or observed 
behavior.14  In theory, antitrust laws increase production and lower prices.15  
In practice, antitrust laws are effective in proscribing mergers of rival firms 
that would otherwise create (quasi)monopoly power.  However, deterring 
and punishing anticompetitive practices, and in particular the apparently 
collusive pricing observed in duopoly16 markets in general and by the 
hypothetical motorist in Utopia in particular, is more difficult. 
10.  Heil et al., supra note 7, at 280.  Although in some industries competition is intensifying, in
others more extensive collaboration is en vogue due to the need for quick responses to rapid market and 
technological changes.  Id. at 281. 
11.  See Jagmohan S. Raju & Abhik Roy, Understanding Competitive Relationships, in WHARTON
ON DYNAMIC STRATEGY 222. 
12. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).  The Sherman Act proscribes “contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”  Id. at § 1. 
13.  Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust Constraints to Competitive Strategy, in WHARTON ON DYNAMIC 
STRATEGY 316. 
14. Joseph Kattan & William R. Vigdor, Game Theory and the Analysis of Collusion in
Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 441, 442 (1997). 
15. Yao, supra note 13, at 317.
16. A duopoly is a market structure in which only two producers supply the market and by virtue
of this have the capacity to exercise market power over price and output. 
 Summer 2012 PRICE CARTELS 289 
D. LIMITATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
1. Explicit Price-Fixing
Explicit price-fixing schemes, along with boycotts and market
allocation agreements, where there is evidence of direct communication 
between firms in establishing the conspiracy to restrain trade, are “naked” 
cartels that have a “pernicious effect on competition”17 and are regarded as 
per se violations of the Sherman Act with no further analysis of the intent 
of the individuals who engaged in these practices or their effects on the 
market.18  As recent scholarship underscores, antitrust law can deter and 
punish explicit agreement price cartels by exploiting distrust between cartel 
members and incentivizing rivals to be the first to confess their existence to 
state regulators in exchange for immunity and other side benefits.19  
However, direct evidence of agreements as to price or output is rare—
duopolists conspiring to create cartels rarely create paper trails 
documenting collusive agreements20—and the mere fact that duopolists 
charge parallel and supracompetitive prices without evidence of direct 
communication and an agreement to restrain trade is not a per se violation 
that the state can readily enjoin via antitrust law.21 
17. Cont’l T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (quoting N. Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
18. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.  No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984); United States v.
Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969) (holding illegal an agreement to exchange price 
information). 
19. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004);
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 455 
(2006). 
20. Cases where duopolists reach express agreements to fix prices but are sufficiently careful to
not allow prosecutors to charge antitrust violations present a distinct category.  For a discussion of how 
antitrust law can nonetheless be used to destroy “naked cartels” even in the absence of evidence 
establishing an explicit agreement, see, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner, & Andrew M. 
Rosenfield, Communications Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
423, 424 (1997). 
21. Firms can “openly and fairly gather and disseminate information” regarding the conduct of
their businesses and even “meet and discuss such information” without violating the Sherman Act so 
long as they do not reach a specific agreement or take any “concerted action with respect to prices or 
production or restraining competition.”  Maple Flooring Mfr. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 
(1925).  In fact, the reciprocal gathering of information regarding prices in order to discover and match 
lower prices charged by rivals promotes the competitive objectives of antitrust law.  DOUGLAS G 
BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDALL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 177 (2d ed. 2003).  
Whether information is exchanged directly or through indirect “signaling” is of less concern to antitrust 
regulators and consumer welfare advocates than whether the information “makes it easier for parties to 
coordinate price or other behavior in an anticompetitive way.”  PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 
1407b (3d ed. 2004).
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2. Rule of Reason Cases
Allegations of antitrust violations in cases where no direct evidence of
conspiracy exists but conscious parallelism of conduct is evident are 
subject to a “rule of reason” in which the lawfulness of the conduct is 
dependent upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances, with a 
focus upon “the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraining 
[of competition], and the reason why it was imposed[.]”22 
3. Proving Violations
In rule of reason cases, defendants’ intent and conduct and the
characteristics of the market are critical inquiries,23 for government 
prosecutors and civil plaintiffs must prove Section One violations 
circumstantially through evidence of conscious parallelism24 as well as 
various “plus factors”—in particular the existence of opportunities for 
rivals to meet,25 to signal their intentions,26 or otherwise to exchange 
information—that support an inference of an agreement to fix prices.27  
Provided defendant firms can offer explanations based in rationality, 
22. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).  However, convictions
in rule-of-reason cases are still possible even with no direct evidence of conspiracy.  See, e.g., Am. 
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 409 (1921) (finding, despite no direct evidence 
of agreements to fix prices, an unlawful restraint of trade because a trade association, in allowing its 
members to meet and discuss prices, had “contributed greatly” to an increase in prices and that an 
agreement was highly probable).  In recent decades, courts have been more chary of lightly inferring 
illegality in rule-of-reason cases.  See infra at notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
23. See Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (holding that “in complex antitrust litigation[,] . . .
motive and intent play leading roles . . . [and] the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged 
conspirators . . . .” 
24. Conscious parallelism is the behavioral pattern whereby duopolists charge supracompetitive
prices in anticipation of rivals pursuing a similar strategy.  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).  Conscious parallelism is not illegal per se but becomes 
unlawful price-fixing when conducted pursuant to an express agreement.  See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH 
Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991). 
25. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400–01 (4th Cir. 1958)
(holding that conspirators’ opportunity to meet is an important plus factor), aff’d, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
26. See Yao, supra note 13, at 323–24 (noting that additional “plus factors” include opportunities
to “signal” intentions regarding price such as reporting clearinghouse, licensing agreements involving 
patented products, and exchange of advertising and marketing plans through industry trade associations 
and proposed mergers and acquisitions). 
27. See Blomnkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (“An
agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when certain ‘plus factors’ exist.”); 
Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[P]arallel pricing, without more, does 
not itself establish a violation . . . .  Courts require additional evidence which they have described as 
‘plus factors.’”).  See generally William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal 
Agreements Under the  Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1993); Reza Dibadj, Conscious 
Parallelism Revisited, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 589 (2010). 
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efficiency, or prevailing market characteristics for parallel pricing that 
make “economic sense,”28 the inference of an agreement is rebutted and 
antitrust law will not permit the punishment of supracompetitive outcomes 
post facto nor require firms to behave irrationally by cutting prices.29  In 
other words, parallel pricing, which is not only lawful but rational under 
certain market conditions, is difficult to distinguish from unlawful price-
fixing,30 and attempts to do so are dependent upon inquiries into whether 
information regarding price is exchanged between rival firms, and upon the 
sensitivity of regulatory agencies and courts to error.  Although a 
noncompetitive outcome is not an inevitable consequence of duopoly, 
failing proof of express price-fixing agreements between rivals, agencies 
and courts, averse to false positives, tolerate many facilitative practices that 
create anticompetitive outcomes, thereby rendering what some suggest is 
the underenforcement of antitrust law rather than indulging in potentially 
mistaken inferences of unlawful conduct.31 
28. Matsushita Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (holding that to meet
the rule of reason test, a firm’s explanation for anticompetitive outcomes must not be “implausible” or 
“make no economic sense.”). 
29. See Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (holding,
under a rule of reason, that evidence of parallel conduct alone is insufficient to violate the antitrust 
prohibition against agreements in restraint of trade).  See also United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 274 
U.S. 693, 693 (1927).  See generally Jonathan Baker, Two Sherman Act Section I Dilemmas: Parallel 
Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 
(1993). 
30. Kattan & Vigdor, supra note 14, at 443 (“[I]f the same firms independently charge the same
price because each rationally recognizes that it is in its best interest to match the price charged by its 
rivals, there is no avoidable conduct that the law can punish, even if the price on which all firms settle is 
higher than what would prevail in a competitive market.”). 
31.  Courts and agencies are increasingly aware of and interested in avoiding “false positives,”
defined as rulings that pricing decisions violate antitrust laws when they are in fact merely rational and 
lawful responses to market conditions and rival decisions, on the theory that market competition will 
eventually correct false negatives whereas the value created by false positives will be lost to the market 
forever.  See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public 
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 123, 147 (2004) (describing the judicial preference for “false 
negatives,” or rulings that pricing decisions do not violate antitrust laws when in fact they should be 
deemed instances of price-fixing, over false negatives.  False positives and false negatives are also 
described in the literature at Type I and Type II errors respectively.  See generally Alan Devlin & 
Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (2010).  Concern over the possibility of 
error—both Types I and II—imposes limits on the reach and effectiveness of antitrust law.  See Frank 
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) (developing this analysis).  Some
fault the judicial preference for Type II over Type I errors as resulting in the systematic
underenforcement of antitrust law, even if this preference preserves competitive and innovative
behavior in general.  See, e.g., Frank Meier-Rigaud & Kay Parplies, EU Merger Control Five Years
After the Introduction of the SIEC Test: What Explains the Drop in Enforcement Activity?, 11 EUR. J.
COMPETITION L. 565 (2009); Devlin & Jacobs, supra, at 79, 131 (describing antitrust law as “seek[ing]
to err on the side of underenforcement” but noting that underenforcement is necessary to avoid
“reduced levels of static and dynamic efficiency”); Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional
Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, UTAH L. REV. 159, 159 (2008)
(noting that the “institutional design” [of antitrust law] is structured so as to lead to systematic
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4. Theoretical Divisions
The Sherman Act was predicated upon the assumption that market
concentration correlates with the increased probability of parallel pricing, 
but subsequent generations of economists and law-and-economics scholars 
“savaged this conventional economic learning . . . as vague, illogical, and 
essentially empty.”32  These rational choice theorists33 suggested that the 
difficulties firms experience in developing the trust and exchanging the 
information necessary to achieve and maintain cooperation—a burden 
termed “transaction costs” that subtract from the benefits incurred through 
cartelization34—should call into question whether concerted action without 
explicit collusion is likely to occur frequently or to enhance profits in the 
long run.35  According to these “cooperation skeptics,” given the fragility of 
price cartels and the costliness in forming and preserving them, any alleged 
underenforcement of antitrust law against firms that engage in parallel 
pricing will not seriously harm social welfare because “successful and 
prolonged cooperation [between firms] is virtually impossible.”36  
However, empirical research by a number of “cooperation optimists” 
challenged the skeptics and concluded that, although it is not inevitable, 
cooperation between rational and mistrustful rivals can emerge and 
underenforcement, resulting in a significantly greater number of false negatives than false positives[,]” 
in order to not undermine competition and innovation).  However, the rationale for avoiding Type I 
errors is ultimately pro-competitive and supportive of social welfare as well: if a more prohibitive per 
se rule applied to cooperative pricing based solely on mutual interdependence and collateral interest and 
did not require evidence of express agreements, firms would be loathe to enter into the market for fear 
of potential criminal and civil liability, and fewer producers would result in fewer products at higher 
prices.  Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Communication Among 
Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 429 (1997). 
32. John Wiley, Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 1906, 1913–14 (1988) (citing J. MCGEE IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971));
HAROLD DEMSMETZ, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE 
NEW LEARNING 164, 165 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds., 1974). 
33. “Rational choice theory”—the most frequent source of explanations and predictions of
behavior in the fields of law and economics and antitrust—is a general term for theories that maintain 
that decisionmakers make decisions to maximize their individual welfare by the means they calculate 
most likely to do so at the lowest costs.  For a general discussion of the origins of rational choice 
theory, see generally, HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957).  For an elaboration of rational choice 
theory as it is applied within the field of law-and-economics scholarship, see RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business eds., 6th ed. 1998). 
34. See Darren Filson, Edward Keen, Eric Fruits & Thomas Borcherding, Market Power and
Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical Test, 44 J. L. & ECON. 465, 465 (2001) (elaborating the 
concept of transaction costs and their inhibition of cartel formation). 
35. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 1754 (Basic Books 1978). 
36. Wiley, supra note 32, at 1914 (citing Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 48
(1929)).  So strong is the disbelief of some cooperation skeptics in the threat of parallel pricing that 
several suggest the Sherman Act be repealed as useless or even counterproductive.  See, e.g., D. 
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986).
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stabilize, leading to increased producer surplus and decreased social 
welfare, provided rivals learn to communicate, engage in correct strategies, 
and evolve towards trust and cooperation.37 
E. PRICE CARTEL FORMATION AND DESTRUCTION
1. General Conditions
Notwithstanding an ongoing lack of theoretical consensus as to
whether firms in concentrated markets are likely to engage in parallel 
pricing and whether antitrust laws should be enacted, interpreted, and 
enforced to suppress the practice, there is broad agreement in support of the 
following two postulates: (1) it is difficult to prosecute price cartels under 
antitrust laws without evidence of an express agreement, and (2) duopolists 
want very much to cooperate to achieve supracompetitive prices and 
profits, and benefit greatly from doing so.38  As empirical observation, 
economic analysis, and, in particular, the use of game theory reveals,39 
rational duopolists, acting in their own self-interests, and in consideration 
of the self-interests of their rivals, can and under certain conditions do form 
cartels, often without creating any evidence of express exchanges of 
information that could be judicially construed as agreements to fix prices.40  
Among these conditions, five are of utmost importance: (a) rivals recognize 
their mutual interdependence and the desirability of cooperation; (b) rivals 
capitalize upon opportunities for mutual gains by evolving tacit agreements 
to engage in supracompetitive, parallel pricing; (c) rivals generate and 
sustain trust that their opposite numbers will not act upon incentives to 
“cheat” on cooperative agreements by charging a lower price in order to 
reap the short-term gains of larger market shares that result from 
competitive pricing; (d) rivals generate and sustain trust that their opposite 
numbers will not act upon incentives to “cheat” on cooperative agreements 
by confessing the existence of such agreements to the state; and (e) rivals 
develop a method of detecting and punishing cheating.41  Failure to satisfy 
37. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
38. See SMITH, supra note 5 (concluding that it is in the nature of producers that they invariably
conspire in attempts to transfer wealth from consumers to firms). 
39. For a discussion of game theory and its application to analysis of the creation and destruction
of cartels, see generally infra Part III. 
40. See Carlton et al., supra note 31, at 424 (noting that parallel pricing arrangements are achieved
by rational duopolists even in the absence of any direct information exchange). 
41. See generally George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964) (enumerating
the second, third, and fourth of these conditions as the “three problems” that must be solved before a 
price cartel can be formed and sustained).  Absent trust, potential cartel members must rely on contract 
or force.  See Leslie, Antitrust, Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 461–62 
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these five conditions results either in the failure to create cartels or the 
failure to sustain them. 
2. The Centrality of Trust
Of these five conditions, the latter three are most difficult to satisfy.
Recognizing mutual interdependence and discerning the benefits of 
agreements to cooperate in order to achieve supracompetitive pricing in 
parallel with rivals requires only that firms think and behave strategically.42  
Developing trust and discovering and punishing its breach are much more 
difficult tasks for entities that rarely intrinsically trust one another.43  Self-
interest analysis, after all, coupled with a presumption against altruism, 
yields the conclusion that cartel members will cheat on agreements if the 
net benefits of doing so are greater than the net benefits of compliance. 
Thus whatever trust cartels can muster is in part a function of the continued 
self-interested preference in cooperation over cheating, as well as the 
capacity to monitor, which permits discovery of whether cartel members 
are cheating by charging competitive prices, and, in turn, the application of 
sanctions to deter future cheating.44  Given the legal prohibition against 
(identifying trust, contract, and force as the three mechanisms whereby firms can create and sustain 
cartels).  However, any contracts to engage in anticompetitive pricing would be unenforceable in the 
courts of the state as a matter of law, and thus any penalties agreed to by the parties for breach of a 
cartel agreement would be ineffective.  See Leslie, Antitrust, Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel 
Stability, supra note 19, at 461–62.  Similarly, the use of force is inefficient and unlikely to yield the 
desired result of mutually high prices.  Id. 
42. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, supra note 19, at 610 (“When they recognize the
benefits of long-term cooperation, rational firms will agree to enter mutually coercive, cartel-
enforcement mechanisms.”). 
43. For a theoretical discussion of the meaning of “trust” and an examination of the process
whereby trust is established and maintained through communication, reputational development, 
identification with groups, and commitments to social norms, see Leslie, Antitrust, Amnesty, Game 
Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 528–46.  For purposes of this Article, “trust” is defined 
as a “calculated decision . . . to engage in a transaction with another based on a probability assessment 
attached to the other person’s likely cooperation[,]” recognizing that the decision to engage in the 
transaction creates vulnerability due to the possibility of betrayal but recognizing also that cooperation 
and the solutions to collective action problems are impossible without accepting this vulnerability.  
Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269 (1991). 
44. In some industries it is not always possible to determine with rapidity and precision whether
rivals are pricing supracompetitively or are cheating and charging competitive prices.  See generally 
Carlton et al., supra note 31.  However, the knowledge that cheating will be sanctioned reduces the 
incentive to cheat and reinforces trust within cartels.  See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of 
Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 822 (1973) (“The benefits of coordination 
frequently depend upon trust that agreed sacrifices of freedom of action will be honored despite 
conflicting temptations.”).  However, if detection of cheating is rendered difficult by the capacity to 
discount secretly or the lack of price transparency, trust is harder to monitor and the incentive to cheat is 
greater.  Leslie, Antitrust, Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 573.  
Moreover, the need for information regarding pricing decisions of rivals becomes more valuable. See 
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direct exchange of information in establishing and maintaining pricing 
agreements, monitoring—which includes practices such as the public 
reporting of business information, the employment of independent auditors 
and administrators, and other methods of gathering and analyzing 
information about rival firms—serves, in effect, as an alternative and 
permissible information exchange that facilitates, or stands in as proxy for 
trust.45 
3. Facilitating and Compromising Trust through Information Exchange
In practice, rivals must exchange information that communicates their
intention to cooperate and, through repeated interactions and the tolerance 
of a certain amount of information “leakage,”46 build mutual reputations for 
fairness, honesty, and reliability such that each individual high-pricing 
decision has a high probability of reciprocation.47  In such a relationship, 
independent efforts to acquire information about a rival’s pricing intentions 
and decisions, and even to some extent about core competencies—which 
would otherwise be viewed as hostile and destructive of cooperation—can 
be analogized to the regime of mutual inspection and verification 
established between the Soviet Union and the United States to manage the 
process of disarmament.48  Information and trust are both imperfect, but 
inspection and verification of a tacit cooperative regime exchanges 
information between rivals that allows them to ascertain if and when 
cheating has occurred and to respond accordingly, reinforces and rewards 
cooperative behavior, and thereby increases trust in the stability of the 
high-price and high-profit arrangement.49  Through information exchange, 
rivals learn to revise their strategies regarding conflict and cooperation on 
the basis of new knowledge about each other and to signal that they have 
Irwin Greenberg, The Role of Deception in Decision Theory, 26 J. CONFL. RES. 139, 149–150 (1982) 
(explaining effects of rivals’ strategies and the transparency of pricing decisions on the value of 
information). 
45. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, supra note 19, at 611–12 (describing monitoring as a
“trust-facilitating device and a trust substitute.”). The courts have monitored various modalities in 
regard to their antitrust implications.  Disclosure of business information to the general public under 
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations and the use of lawful competitive intelligence 
methods are exemplars of permissible methods, whereas agreements to use delivered prices, adhere to 
announced prices, and standardize product content and credit have been found to violate the rule of 
reason.  See, e.g., Kattan & Vigdor, supra note 14, at 454 (discussing cases). 
46.  See A. Matsui, Information Leakage Forces Cooperation, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 94,
94–96 (1989) (describing the unintentional transfer of information between cooperating rivals as 
“leakage”). 
47.  See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 23–24. 
48.  STEVEN J. BRAMS, SUPERPOWER GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO SUPERPOWER 
CONFLICT 100 (1985). 
49.  See infra at Part V.C. and notes.
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acquired such knowledge, enabling steerage of mutual behavior toward 
desired outcomes.50  In short, monitoring leads to information exchange, 
and information exchange, so long as it does not constitute a proscribed 
express agreement, can render cooperation rational because it promotes the 
trust, or creates the trust-substitute, without which cartels cannot endure.51 
4. Cartel Destruction
Information exchange, while it is vital to creating the trust necessary
to create and sustain cooperation, poses risks to the firms that engage in it. 
The difficulty firms face in generating trust, the monitoring cartel members 
employ to enhance or substitute for trust, and the potential gains for 
members and third parties in exploiting that trust, present opportunities to 
consumers and regulators frustrated by supracompetitive pricing and 
antitrust law’s seeming “inability to do much about it.”52  If cartels cannot 
form or survive absent trust, and if information exchange is necessary to 
creating and sustaining trust, the mission for consumers and regulators is 
clear: disrupt or corrupt the information exchange before cooperation 
occurs, if possible, so that cartels do not form—but afterward if necessary, 
so that trust collapses and cartels cannot arise or endure. 
a. Disruption of Information Exchange
i. Between Firms
The first such opportunity to disrupt the information exchange that 
supports the trust necessary to create and sustain price cartels arises in the 
issue area of intellectual property.  Firms cannot survive the 
misappropriation of their intellectual property, and in particular their trade 
secrets53 (which create competitive advantage) are costly and time-
50. Matsui, supra note 46, at 98.
51. Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, supra note 19, at 527.  Cooperation requires trust, which
is difficult to muster, particularly when firms have incentives not to cooperate and when the only way to 
secure mutually optimal outcomes is for each firm to render itself vulnerable to duplicity at the hands of 
a rival.  When insufficient trust exists, distrust can “block even the attempt at cooperation” among 
potential cartel members.  Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 463–
64. By contrast, when trust exists, cooperation becomes possible because the expected gains for each
firm are greater in the long run than the gains from cheating.  For a discussion of the dilemma firms
face in determining whether to cooperate, and of the importance of trust to the resolution of this
dilemma, see infra at Part II.A.
52. BAIRD, GERTNER, & PICKER, supra note 21, at 178. 
53. A trade secret is any undisclosed information that can be used in the operation of a business or
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable to afford actual or potential economic advantage over 
others.  The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 defines a trade secret as follows: 
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consuming to develop, and form the majority of their value.54  Although 
firms routinely gather publicly available or “open source” information 
about rivals55—a lawful practice known as “competitive intelligence” 
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs,
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret;
and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, the public. 
See Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (1996) [hereinafter “EEA”].  Virtually any 
information, whether or not recorded, qualifies for trade secret protection if its exclusivity affords it 
economic value and it is reasonably guarded.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. B (1939).  Trade 
secrets are not limited to scientific or technological information; they may include information 
regarding formulas, recipes, materials specifications, means of manufacturing, computer programs, 
costs, price information, vendor and customer lists.  Trade secrets are distinct from patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks in that unlike these other three species of  intellectual property they are required to be 
kept secret from rivals as well as from the general public and are not required to be registered with the 
state to be enforceable.  See Kenneth A Kovach, Mark Pruett, Linda B. Smith, & Christopher Duvall, 
Protecting Trade Secrets During Employee Migration: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, 55 LAB. 
L.J. 69, 73 (2004) (differentiating trade secrets from other forms of intellectual property).  Firms may
elect not to patent innovations either because they fall outside the scope of patent law, because trade
secrets are subject to protection for unlimited duration whereas patents are time limited.  See Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and
Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 380–406 (2002) (listing factors that
firms consider in choosing between patent and trade secret protection).  Trade secret protections endure
so long as the trade secrets are properly guarded and not developed independently or reverse engineered
by a rival firm.
54. See generally Don Weisner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 
1076 (1988) (describing the importance of trade secrets to firms); John Brandt, Theft in (Your) Office, 
INDUSTRY WEEK, June 17, 1996, at 6.  The average modern firm may derive seventy percent or more of 
its value from its intellectual property, to include trade secrets.  See Kurt M. Saudners, The Law Ethics 
of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 209, 210–11 (2006) (citing studies).  Firms in high-
tech manufacturing, computer technology, genetics, and pharmaceutical industries among others may 
derive nearly all their market value from trade secrets.  Kovach et al., supra note 53, at 71–72.  Rather 
than expending years and large sums of money to bring competing products to market, firms that steal 
trade secrets bring equivalent products to market by copying a proven design or process and thereby 
enhance market share, bypass costly research and development, and enjoy increased profits relative to 
their rivals.  See F.W. RUSTMAN, JR., CIA, INC.: ESPIONAGE AND THE CRAFT OF BUSINESS 
INTELLIGENCE 110–11 (Brassey’s Inc. ed., 2002) (describing the advantages to the misappropriating 
firm of trade secret theft). 
55. Congressional testimony in hearings that established the Securities Act reveals that
Competitive Intelligence was well-established in U.S. industrial practice by the 1930s, as does 
academic literature of the period.  See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing before the Senate Banking 
and Currency Comm., 73d Cong., 1 (1934) reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen Mahar eds., 
1973).  (“[T]he system of commercial espionage that exists at the present time in the United States is so 
perfect that normally the directors of a corporation know much more about their competitors’ business 
than they do even about their own[.]”); Notes & Legislation, Industrial Policing and Espionage, 52 
HARV. L. REV. 793, 793 (1939) (describing the rise of “industrial espionage” in the nineteenth century). 
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(“CI”)56 the imperative to monitor pricing by fellow cartel members 
presents rivals with opportunities and incentives to extend their collection 
and analysis of data beyond legal and ethical boundaries into what is 
known as “economic espionage” (“EE”).  Although the precise boundary 
between CI and EE is not sharply limned,57 the defining distinction is that 
whereas CI goes no further than necessary to verify strategies and facilitate 
cooperation, EE involves the outright theft of trade secrets and the direct 
inter-firm transfer of value.58  When cartel rivals resort to EE,59 information 
56. “Competitive intelligence [“CI”] is the ethical and lawful application of industry and research
expertise to analyze publicly available information on rivals and to produce actionable intelligence that 
supports informed and strategic business decisions.  STRATEGIC AND COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 
PROFESSIONALS, http://www.scip.org/content.cfm?itemnumber=2214&&navItem Number=492. In the 
increasingly information- and R&D-dependent economy, knowledge about rivals—capital investment 
decisions, research plans, R&D data, product designs, marketing strategies, cost structures, and pricing 
strategies—waxes ever more valuable to the formulation and execution of business strategies.  See 
Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market who Report Trade 
Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW 25, 25 (2001). Such information aids 
firms in anticipating changes in demand, preempting market entrants, reducing the cost of innovation, 
and countering rivals’ strategies, among other desiderata, modeling of rival executives, trade shows, 
monitoring mass media, and conversations with a rival’s customers, partners, and employees.  See 
generally JOHN E. PRESCOTT, PROVEN STRATEGIES IN COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE (John E. Prescott & 
Stephan H. Miller eds., 2001).  Common CI methods include data mining, patent tracking, 
psychological modeling of rival executives, trade shows, monitoring mass media, and conversations 
with a rival’s customers, partners, and employees.  Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State 
Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage Act, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 389, 413 (2006).  
CI does not connote misappropriation by theft, deception, or otherwise of proprietary information or 
trade secrets but depends in the main on open-source public information, shareholders reports, 
advertising, sales literature, press releases, news stories, published interviews. See generally Anthony J. 
Dennis, Assessing the Risks of Competitive Intelligence Activities under the Antitrust Laws, 46 S.C.L. 
REV. 263, 266 (1995) (differentiating CI from illegal information gathering activities).  CI has a long 
and rich pedigree: its first recorded use was in the sixth century A.D., when the Byzantine Emperor 
Justinian dispatched monks to visit China and smuggle away silkworm eggs and mulberry seeds in 
order to break the Chinese monopoly on silk production.  See JACQUES BERGIER, SECRET ARMIES: THE 
GROWTH OF CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIANAGE 4 (Harold J. Salemson trans.,  Bobbs-Merrill 
1969). The use of CI to monitor tacit cartel arrangements as a trust enhancement or substitute has been 
recognized for decades. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE 24, 34 (1994).  (“While the 
compulsion to spy belies a deep-seated distrust, the reconnaissance obtained can create some measure 
of trust or confidence that a cartel partner is abiding by her commitments.”).  For a bibliography of the 
CI field see P. Dishman & V. Knip, A Chronological and Categorized Bibliography of Key Competitive 
Intelligence Scholarship, 1 JOURNAL OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE & MGMT. 1 (2003). 
57. CI activities which are not unlawful but raise ethical questions include appropriating
documents misplaced by rivals, overhearing rival executives discuss strategy, hiring employees away 
from a rival, and “dumpster diving” in a rival’s trash receptacles. See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, 
at 25 (defining lawful but unethical CI activities); Victoria Sind-Flor, Industry Spying Still Flourishes, 
NAT’L L. J., Mar. 29, 2000, at 1–3. 
58. EE is the illegal aspect of information gathering and analysis conducted against rival firms and
is sometimes regarded as the “dark” side or unlawful subset of CI.  Methods of EE include electronic 
eavesdropping, surveillance of rival executives and scientists, social engineering (misrepresenting 
identities to trick people into yielding information), bribing employees or vendors, planting “moles” in 
rival firms, bugging offices, hacking and stealing computers, cybertheft of data, and outright stealing 
trade secrets in documentary, electronic, and other formats.  Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 25. By 
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subject to collection and conversion includes not merely pricing data but 
everything that competitively advantages the collector relative to the target, 
and in particular information regarding strategy, technology, and research 
and development—in short, trade secrets.60  Firms that acquire trade secrets 
increase in value, while firms surrendering secrets decline in value. Thus, 
while the exchange of information regarding rivals can promote, or 
substitute for, trust within a cartel, it can also destroy it. 
Increasing frequency and severity of trade secret theft, exacerbated by 
the inadequacy of the jurisdictional reach and available remedies under 
existing state and federal laws,61 led the U.S. to enact the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”), which imposes ten years’ imprisonment 
using EE, firms can save “millions of dollars and years of research if it can obtain information already 
gathered by others rather than having to develop it independently.”  RUSTMAN, supra note 54, at 110.  
As the pace and cost of technological development have accelerated, the attractiveness of EE as a 
means for achieving competitive advantage has grown.  Id.  Misappropriation of trade secrets through 
EE reallocates over $100 billion from innovators to misappropriators annually by enabling rivals to 
eliminate developmental dead-ends and introduce goods and services sooner and at lower cost.   Carr & 
Gorman, supra note 56, at 26.  The value of a trade secret targeted in a single EE operation can exceed 
$20 million.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Patrick Worthing, No. 97-CR-9 (W.D. Pa., filed Dec. 9, 1996) (alleging a 
former PPG employee stole trade secrets valued at $20 million which he attempted to sell to Owens-
Corning); United States v. Pin Yen Yang, et al., CR-No. 1:97-CR-288 (N.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 3, 1997) 
(convicting defendant for stealing R&D with estimated value of $50 million to $60 million). 
59. Although EE is also conducted by foreign governments for politico-military objectives; such as
acquisition of defense technologies or closing the developmental gap, this Article focuses exclusively 
on the use of EE by cartel members cooperating and competing against each other on economic 
grounds, and indeed the overwhelming majority of EE prosecutions are brought against domestic, rather 
than foreign, defendants.  See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret 
Misappropriation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 455, 466–68 (2006) (discussing 
reasons for very limited prosecution of foreign EE defendants); id. at 478–79 (“In general, state-
sponsored espionage is carried out with impunity with a trivial chance of being detected let alone 
prosecuted under the EEA.”).  For a discussion of the use of EE by foreign governments, see generally, 
JOHN F. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA (W.W. Norton & Co. 
Inc., 1997); Karen Sepura, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World Economic War, 26 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 127 (1998). 
60. See Ann S. Jennings & Suzanne E. Tomkies, An Overlooked Site of Trade Secret and Other
Intellectual Property Leaks: Academia, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 241, 285 (2000) (enumerating 
categories of common information sought and accessed in the collection of EE). 
61.  See Harry Wingo, Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret Law, 16 YALE
L & POL’Y REV. 195, 213–15 (1997) (explaining remedial and jurisdictional shortcomings of state trade 
secrets laws, including lack of criminal sanctions, costs to plaintiffs, and lack of effective damage 
remedies); Christopher A. Ruhl, Corporate and Economic Espionate: A Model Penal Approach for 
Legal Deterrence to Theft of Corporate Trade Secrets and Proprietary Business Information, 33 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 763, 772 (1999) (discussing the incongruity of federal statutes that predate the EEA,
including legislation governing wire fraud, mail fraud, and transportation of stolen property, with the
specific subject matter of the protection of trade secrets); James H.A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley, & Peter
J. Toren, Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 179
(1997) (describing the EEA as a remedial statute to address deficiencies of and fill lacunae in existing
state and federal laws).  For a substantive and procedural discussion and analysis of the EEA, see Shuba
Ghosh, Open Borders, the U.S. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, and the Global Movement of
Knowledge and People, 21 KING’S L.J. 1, 27–32 (2010).
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and $250,000 upon natural persons, fines of up to $5 million per firm, and 
property forfeiture upon conviction of the knowing receipt, purchase, or 
possession of trade secrets.62 However, fifteen years after passage of the 
EEA fewer than sixty cases have been filed—far fewer than anticipated63—
and the vast majority of cases go unreported, while many of those that are 
reported go unprosecuted.64  Even when defendants have been convicted 
under the EEA, punishment has been rather gentle: courts have imposed 
sentences averaging under two years’ imprisonment and fines averaging 
less than $50,000—or about a penny for every $10 of value targeted.65 
Several grounds have been advanced for the under-enforcement of the 
EEA.  Three are common to the enforcement of criminal statutes more 
generally.  The burden of proof—already high in criminal law—is even 
more difficult to meet when the prosecution must establish that the 
defendant could not have simultaneously developed the trade secrets at 
issue and when reverse engineering is not expressly prohibited by the EEA. 
Additionally, enforcement resources are scarce, and other priorities drive 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.66  Moreover, the EEA fails to 
afford meaningful remedies to many firms subjected to EE attacks: 
Although the EEA authorizes courts to award civil restitution for the value 
62. See EEA, supra note 53, at §§ 1832(a)(2), 1834(e), & 1839(3) (providing criminal penalties,
forfeitures, and fines for the knowing but unauthorized taking, alteration or destruction of a trade secret 
by any means, as well as the knowing receipt of a trade secret taken without authorization). 
63.  The U.S. Department of Justice has brought fewer than sixty prosecutions under the EEA
between 1996 and 2011. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, J. Derek Mason, and David A. Oblon, The Economic 
Espionage Act: A Prosecution Update, OBLON SPIVAK, (July 1998), http://www.oblon.com/ 
publications/economic-espionage-act-prosecution-update. Given the volume of  EE punishable under 
the EEA, one would expect an annual average much greater than just under four EEA prosecutions.  See 
Sepura, supra note 59, at 139–40 (concluding that the number of cases prosecuted under the EEA is 
probably a “miniscule portion” of the number of violations that occur).  Most EEA prosecutions have 
involved non-U.S. nationals engaged in EE on behalf of foreign governments; prosecution of domestic 
EE has been infrequent and the rate has declined in recent years.  See Aaron J. Burnstein, Trade Secrecy 
as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundation of Economic Espionage, 41 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 933, 971 (2009) (analyzing cases). 
64. See WINKLER, supra note 9, at 168–70 (stating that thousands of cases of EE go unreported
each year and more escape detection); Rustad, supra note 59, at 494–95 (analyzing cases and 
determining that federal law enforcement officials participated in investigations of only one in four 
reported cases of EE and that “the government will only infrequently devote significant resources to the 
investigation, prosecution and enforcement of the EEA”); Rustad, supra note 59, at 494–95 (reporting 
that even when the DOJ elects to investigate a report of EEA it waits until the targeted firm performs 
the bulk of the investigative labor before making an investigative or charging decision). 
65.  See Chris Carr, et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 199 (2000) (“For those who wanted to see the EEA used to punish defendants 
who steal valuable trade secrets, the EEA has proven to be a disappointment”); id. at 196–200 
(surveying cases and noting that convicted defendants pay fines that represent approximately 1/1000 of 
the value of those secrets).  In the case of U.S. v. Pin Yen Yang et al,, two convicted individuals from a 
firm that stole trade secrets worth up to $60 million were ordered to pay fines of $250,000 and $5,000 
respectively.  See United States v. Pin Yen Yang, et al., 74 F. Supp. 2d 724, 724 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
66. See Ruhl, supra note 61, at 785–86 (enumerating difficulties in proving EEA cases). 
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of lost trade secrets, in practice such awards have seriously undervalued the 
loss to the targets of EE.67 
Other explanations are connected to the practical mechanics of 
prosecution, but are motivated by the rational self-interest of targeted firms 
in protecting their value against secondary loss through the market effects 
of disclosing thefts and through leakage during litigation.  The publicity 
attendant to admitting the theft of trade secrets is, in practice, more costly 
than the value of the secrets themselves.68  Evidence indicates that 
prosecuting a claim under the EEA is likely to result in two undesirable 
effects: (1) the defendant, whether an individual or a firm, will likely be 
granted access through discovery to the trade secrets at issue in order to aid 
the defense, thus in effect completing the attempted crime and enriching 
the culpable firm in the amount of the value of the information minus any 
fines,69 and (2) when information that a publicly traded firm has been 
victimized by EE is revealed in litigation, the stock price of the victimized 
firm falls to reflect the diminished market view of its value.70  Empirical 
67. See Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Calculating Loss Under the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 323 (2000) (analyzing methods, and in particular the 
use of market value, of calculating the value of lost trade secrets by courts and arguing that such 
methods seriously undervalue both the harms to the victims of EE and the gains to the perpetrators).  On 
the valuation of misappropriated intellectual property, see generally Edward M. Roche, Internet and 
Computer Related Crime: Economic and Other Harms to Organizational Entities, 76 MISS. L.J. 639 
(2007); F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex 
Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L.J. 1175 (2002–2003). 
68.  See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 28. 
69.  See United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1987), rev’d 155 F.3d 189 (3d
Cir. 1998) (leaving open the opportunity for defendants charged with substantive crimes under the EEA 
to demand discovery of the victim firm’s trade secrets and related documents).  This unsavory prospect 
was anticipated in congressional hearings prior to the enactment of EEA.  See S. Rep. No. 104–359, at 
11 (1996) (“Even if a company does bring [charges], the . . . penalties are often absorbed by the 
offender as a cost of doing business and the stolen information retained for continued use.”).  Although 
the EEA provides that the court “shall enter such orders and take such action as may be necessary and 
appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with . . . all other applicable 
laws[,]”  in practice EEA defendants have resorted to “graymail,” defined as the practice of obtaining 
trade secrets through discovery and thereafter threatening to disclose them unless criminal charges are 
dropped.  See Allyson A. McKenzie, United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu: An Examination of the 
Confidentiality Provision of the Economic Espionage Act: Is it Suitable to Maintain the Use and 
Effectiveness of the EEA?, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 309, 319, 321 (describing the use of graymail in EEA 
prosecutions); EEA, supra note 53, at § 1835 (authorizing courts to issue protective discovery orders). 
Courts are reluctant to limit discovery to protect firms’ trade secrets on the ground that overbroad 
orders limiting discovery might infringe on defendants’ constitutional rights to confront witnesses 
through discovery of documents, to include the very trade secrets they are accused of stealing.  See 
Dennis J. Kelly & Paul Mastrocola, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 181, 190 (2000) (discussing how courts resolve this tension in favor of defendants’
rights to access firms’ trade secrets through discovery); see also Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 56, at
437. 
70.  See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 39–40; see also Weld Royal, Too Much Trust?, 
INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 1 (“Information loss is like the AIDS of corporate America . . . For a 
long time no one would talk about it, fearing the impact on their stock prices and confidence of 
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research indicates that public disclosures of trade secret theft are associated 
with a statistically significant negative stock market response: When the 
market discovers that a firm has been subjected to EE it responds, and the 
market capitalization of the targeted firm decreases, as the consequence of 
this discovery, by 0.892% on average.71  Firms suffer when they are 
perceived by customers and investors as incapable of safeguarding their 
classified information.  Rational firms understand that, when victimized by 
EE, they are best off economically if they do not report the crime.72 
Whether based upon the narrow economic self-interests of firms and 
prosecutors or on some other rationale(s), underenforcement of the EEA 
incentivizes the use of EE, renders trade secrets more vulnerable, 
destabilizes the trust necessary to creating and maintaining cartels, and 
advances the objectives of antitrust law and antitrust regulators—increased 
enforcement, increased competition, and enhanced social welfare.73 
ii. Between Firms and the State
A second opportunity to disrupt the information exchange that
supports the trust necessary to create and sustain price cartels arises within 
the antitrust regime itself.  Price-fixing is a criminal violation of the 
Sherman Act, with maximum fines for each offense of $100 million for a 
firm,74 and additional fines of up to twice the gain from the illegal activity 
or twice the loss suffered by the victim.75  Firms that enter agreements—
whether tacit or express—to cooperate in achieving supracompetitive 
customers”). 
71.  See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 44–47, 49, 50 (developing a model based on eleven
cases of EE where the monetary value of trade secrets stolen is conservatively estimated and data are 
controlled for other variables and finding a correlation between victimization by CE and loss of market 
capitalization).  Others dispute the quantifiability of the costs of EE.  See, e.g, LARRY KAHANER, 
COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE, 230 (Simon and Schuster, 1996) (“Trying to quantify the direct effect of 
competitive intelligence is like a city trying to quantify the return it receives on having excellent 
schools, fire department, police, and trash pickup.”). 
72.  See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 52 (reporting that rational firms victimized by EE have
little incentive to seek prosecution under the EEA).  Perhaps the sole reason why a firm might seek 
criminal charges against another firm for theft of trade secrets is to inflict reputational harm in the hope 
that the damage will be so great as to eliminate that rival from the market altogether.  See supra note 57,  
at 1 (offering this explanation for the EEA).  One study indicates the stock market “reacts negatively to 
the release of news of firm illegality.”  Wallace N. Davidson III, et al., Stock Market Reactions to 
Announced  Corporate Illegalities, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 979, 985 (1994).  Whether this benefits the 
reporting firm or merely punishes the firm engaged in EE is unclear. 
73. For a discussion of additional grounds for underenforcement of the EEA, as well as of the
utility of EEA underenforcement to the promotion of the objectives of antitrust law, see infra Part IV.C. 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1987).  In addition, individuals harmed as a result of the criminal act may
sue for damages of up to three times their actual damages—usually incurred through the payment of 
supracompetitive prices—plus attorney’s fees.  15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). 
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prices incur potential criminal exposure under the Sherman Act.  However, 
in many instances there is insufficient evidence to secure a conviction 
without testimony from a suspected cartel member.  To break cartels, the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice introduced its Corporate 
Leniency Policy (“CLP“) in 1993, which offers automatic amnesty to firms 
willing to “cheat” on their agreements and expose price cartels in exchange 
for evidence that convicts their rivals.76  Firms that confess and provide 
substantial assistance to the state in the form of testimony and other aids in 
proving unlawful agreements before their rivals can do so are guaranteed 
no criminal fines; subsequent confessors can only hope for reductions in 
fines.77  Accordingly, firms who have entered into agreements, whether 
tacit or express, to achieve supracompetitive pricing must consider, in 
deciding whether to “rat out” other firms, the likelihood that their 
counterparts will confess rather than remain silent and preserve the 
existence, and benefits, of the cartel.  In sum the CLP, in recognition of the 
inability of antitrust law to reach some aspects of anticompetitive conduct 
and of the importance of trust to the creation and destruction of price 
cartels, overtly orients federal antitrust enforcement strategy toward the 
fostering of distrust. 
2. Implications for Antitrust Theory
Taken together, under-enforcement of the EEA and the CLP suggest a
means whereby antitrust regulators can exploit the exchange of information 
to destroy trust and thereby achieve better suppression of supracompetitive 
pricing than is possible through antitrust law and standard enforcement 
measures alone.  The implications of these instrumentalities, however, are 
much broader than their applications to particular instances of 
anticompetitive pricing in that they point toward a more general theory: 
specifically, if information exchange can be exploited to promote distrust, 
and if distrust can be magnified to preclude or to destroy cooperation, then 
cooperation, which rests on trust, can be denatured through the strategic 
exploitation of information, and price cartels, which are the external 
76. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 19, 1993) [hereinafter
“CLP”] (granting automatic amnesty in the absence of a preexisting government investigation into 
price-fixing and is available under some circumstances even if the state has initiated an investigation).  
See also Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 465–66, 474–
75 (describing operation of the CLP). Moreover, although only the first confessor receives full amnesty, 
subsequent confessors receive discounts on criminal fines.  Id.  First confessors, in addition, are not 
liable for treble damages or for damages caused by fellow cartel members in follow-on private lawsuits: 
the CLP eliminates treble damages for the first confessor and limits liability to single damages caused 
by that firm itself.  Id. 
77. CLP, supra note 76. 
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manifestations of agreements to cooperate, can be prevented or destroyed. 
If the presumption incorporated within antitrust law is that competition is 
the default or original relational status of firms before they conspire to 
achieve supracompetitive prices, and if the objective of antitrust law is to 
deter or defeat cooperation and maintain or return cartel members to a 
competitive relationship, then cooperation must be presumed as the result 
of the evolution of the relational status of firms.  Accordingly, a theory that 
explains and predicts the creation and destruction of price cartels as a 
function of the degree to which rivals evolve toward or devolve from 
cooperative behavior must draw the strategic use of information to create 
and destroy trust within the chain of causation. 
III. A THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION AND
DEVOLUTION OF PRICE CARTELS
A. INTRODUCTION
1. The Origin of Competition: Evolutionary Theory and the Struggle for
Survival
Evolutionary theory (“ET”), first developed in the field of biological 
science, explains the change over time in characteristics of a population as 
the result of the struggle for life and the tendency for only the fittest 
organisms to out-compete others for access to resources and mates and 
therefore to be “selected” by nature to survive and pass along their genes to 
the next generation.78  The differential rates of survival and reproduction of 
the fittest organisms—a function of their genes as well as of the strategies 
they employ in competition with other organisms—ensure that their genetic 
characteristics appear more often in future generations than those of less fit 
organisms.  As adapted from its biological context to explain and predict 
change in an array of natural and artificial contexts, ET similarly regards 
entities to be self-interested and in a natural state of competition with one 
another over status, power, and other resources that contribute to survival 
and reproduction.79  In short, in the explanations and predictions of change 
offered by ET, survival of the fittest is the default rule, and competition is 
the default strategy. 
78. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
79. See generally PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT: POLITICS, EVOLUTION, AND COOPERATION 
6 (2000). 
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2. The Problem of Cooperation: Evolution, Advantages, and Devolution
In the sociobiological context, while the presumption of self-interest
and the survival imperative remain,80 the “problem of cooperation” presents 
a challenge to ET’s assumption that competition is the ubiquitous, 
immutable, and optimal strategy for humans to ensure their survival and 
genetic propagation into future generations.81  Although humans do indeed 
compete over the resources necessary for survival, they also engage in 
patterns of mutual cooperation and even acts of altruism with kin and 
members of their social groups,82 and these patterns of cooperation and 
altruism, which ostensibly benefit others in addition to, and even rather 
than, the individuals who perform cooperative and altruistic acts, seem at 
first blush to run counter to ET’s specification of competition as the default 
strategy that renders individuals fit for survival and for the propagation of 
genes into the future.  However, while competition is the default strategy, 
ET does not compel competition if the object of competition—survival to 
the end that genes are propagated into future generations—can be achieved 
more readily and at lower cost with another strategy.  As rational actors, 
humans desire the greatest survival benefits at the lowest costs, and thus 
their preference for strategy is endogenous—a function of the relative costs 
and benefits of available strategic alternatives—rather than exogenous—
determined solely by nature.83 
Moreover, given human rationality and thus the endogeneity of human 
preferences for survival strategies, the relevant level of analysis upon 
which natural selection operates to select the fittest genes for propagation 
into future generations is not the genes themselves but the strategies that 
rational human decision makers select and reject as they attempt to 
maximize survival benefits and minimize resource costs: successful 
80. HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY:  EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED ECONOMIC
REASON 215 (1997) (“In our century, we have watched two great nations, the People’s Republic of 
China and the Soviet Union, strive to create a ‘new man,’ only to end up by acknowledging that the ‘old 
man’—self-interested and concerned with his or her economic welfare, or the welfare of the family, 
clan, ethnic group, or province, was still alive and well.”). 
81. See John L. Casti, Cooperation: The Ghost in the Machinery of Evolution, in COOPERATION 
AND CONFLICT IN GENERAL EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES 63–64 (John L. Casti & Anders Karlqvist, 
eds., 1995) (coining the phrase “problem of cooperation” to describe patterns of noncompetitive 
behavior within human groupings that present seeming contradictions to the competitive assumption of 
ET). 
82. PETER M. KAPPELER & CAREL P. VAN SCHAIK, COOPERATION IN PRIMATES AND HUMANS:
MECHANISMS AND EVOLUTION 3 (Peter M. Kappeler & Carel P. van Schaik, eds., 2006) (reporting that 
most humans, and many primates, will enter into mutually beneficial forms of cooperation and even 
engage in altruistic acts with no expectation of reciprocal benefit). 
83. See id. at 254 (explaining that human preferences with regard to survival strategies are
endogenous—determined by reference to their relative costs and benefits—rather than exogenous—
dictated by nature). 
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strategies continue to be chosen, and the genes of those who choose 
successful strategies are passed along to future generations, whereas 
unsuccessful strategies are abandoned, and the genes of those who choose 
unsuccessful strategies are not perpetuated.84  The problem of cooperation 
thus raises three primary questions: (1) how does cooperation evolve from 
competition between rational self-interested individuals with no central 
authority to guide the process?; (2) does cooperation confer advantages 
over competition as a survival strategy?; and (3) is cooperation 
evolutionarily stable,85 or will it devolve toward competition?86 
a. Evolution and Advantages of Cooperation
To the first two questions, scholars contend that, despite the vigorous
competition that characterized the struggle for survival among self-
interested individuals, cooperation evolved spontaneously “from small 
clusters of individuals who base[d] their cooperation on reciprocity” and 
had repeated interactions with each other that, over time, instilled 
confidence in the probability that risky acts benefiting others would be 
reciprocated in kind.87  Perhaps even more crucially, cooperators learned 
that cooperation, whether through collective hunting, agriculture, defense, 
or other joint ventures, increased available resources (collectively as well 
as individually), reduced resource costs, and conferred survival 
advantages.88  As trust and understandings of the evolutionary benefits of 
cooperation deepened within groups of cooperators, and as particular 
individuals developed reputations for cooperation that decreased the risk of 
84. AXELROD, supra note 37, at ix–x. 
85. See infra at Part III.A (providing definition of “evolutionary stability”).
86. AXELROD, supra note 37, at viii–ix (enumerating central questions in the study of the evolution
of cooperation). 
87. Id. at 20–21 (explaining that for some scholars, trust is not necessary to evolve from
competition to cooperation).  See also id. at 173–74 (suggesting that the expectation that cooperative 
acts will be reciprocated can be reinforced solely with the threat that cooperation will cease if 
reciprocation fails).  Other scholars regard the mutual expectations of continued cooperation, however 
supported, as the basis for, and even the very definition of, trust, and maintain that trust is the essence of 
sustained cooperation.  See, e.g., ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 
OF CULTURES (2005).  This Article subscribes to the view that the divergence between these two 
positions is, in most applications to strategic interactions between individuals, a distinction without a 
difference—at least not of sufficient theoretical significance to require the differentiation of the two 
phenomena. 
88. See MARTIN A. NOWAK, SUPERCOOPERATORS:  ALTRUISM, EVOLUTION, AND WHY WE NEED 
EACH OTHER TO SUCCEED xvi (2011) (tracing the development of cooperation through the emergence 
of mutual aid and concluding that “cooperation is entirely compatible with the hard-boiled arithmetic of 
survival in an unremittingly cold-eyed and competitive environment” because it confers survival 
advantages).  Many of these survival advantages of cooperation are termed “public goods” within the 
field of economics. 
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investing trust in them, “clear patterns of mutually understood behavior 
between entities that continue interacting” reinforced the evolution of 
cooperation,89 and over many millennia the human propensity to cooperate 
conferred survival advantages upon cooperators relative to noncooperators 
and were passed along through natural selection to subsequent 
generations.90  Thus, over time, human preferences for cooperation over 
competition that emerged spontaneously became part of the evolutionary 
logic embedded within the socially constructed cultures of cooperating 
groups, as well as within the biologically determined “nature” of 
individuals who bore the genes of progenitors who chose cooperation as a 
survival strategy, through the exercise of rational choice reinforced by the 
process of natural selection.91 
b. Devolution of Cooperation
To the third question, cooperation is more evolutionarily stable than
competition in that, once established within a population, the long-run 
benefit of cooperation is sufficiently greater than the short-run benefit of 
competition such that natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent 
competition from displacing cooperation.92  However, cooperation, 
although more evolutionarily stable, is, by definition, a more highly 
evolved form of strategic interaction than competition in that it confers 
survival advantages relative to competition.  Moreover, cooperation is a 
more organized form of strategic interaction because it is contingent and 
requires more than just naked self-interest to create and maintain.93  In 
other words, the defense of cooperation against devolution—defined as the 
89. AXELROD, supra note 37, at 83. 
90. MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 6 (1997); NOWAK, supra note 88, at xiv (identifying
the “breathtaking ability to cooperate” as “one of the main reasons [humans] have managed to 
survive”). 
91. Natural selection works not only upon genes but also upon cultures and strategies. NOWAK,
supra note 88, at 269 (developing a mathematical argument that natural selection favors cooperators 
over defectors).  The phrase “evolutionary logic” is used to describe the learning that occurs as natural 
selection proceeds and individuals come to discover the benefits of cooperation over time. KAPPELER & 
VAN SCHAIK, supra note 82, at v. 
92. See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, ON EVOLUTION (1972) (introducing the concept of
evolutionary stability).  See also BOYD & RICHERSON, supra note 87, at 135 (specifying the conditions 
for evolutionary stability that the long-run benefit from mutual cooperation be greater than the short-run 
benefit for competition and that there be sufficient frequency of adoption of and interaction with the 
cooperative strategy, where b = benefit, c = cost of cooperation, t = average number of interactions 
between individuals, and evolutionary stability occurs where t(b-c) > b); RIDLEY, supra note 90, at 59 
(same). 
93. See NOWAK, supra note 88, at 280 (concluding that cooperation is more evolutionarily
advanced and complex than competition and “can draw living matter upward to higher levels of 
organization”). 
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reversal of the direction of evolution and reversion toward a more 
primitive, less organized form of strategic interaction—requires more than 
just ensuring that the benefits of cooperation are greater than those 
available through competition, a task not especially difficult to accomplish 
so long as there is a willingness to impose sanctions upon those who 
abandon cooperation.  Thus, devolution to competition, whether engineered 
from inside or outside the human population in which cooperation has 
evolved, is possible notwithstanding its evolutionary stability.94  What 
determines whether cooperation endures or devolves toward cooperation is 
the degree of trust that prevails within the population. 
3. The Condition for Cooperation: Establishing and Preserving Trust
The defense of cooperation against devolution requires more than just
the diffusion of a rational appreciation of its benefits within a population of 
interest; it also requires the establishment and preservation of trust—a more 
complex and potentially difficult task, but a necessary task, for, in a real 
sense, trust is a necessary condition for cooperation.95  Cooperation is 
riskier than competition in that it invites opportunism, and potential 
cooperators are sensitive to the possibility that others will exploit their 
cooperative acts by failing to reciprocate or by “bow[ing] out at the 
moment of [a] dangerous collective action, thereby exposing the partner(s) 
to considerable risk of injury.”96  The evolution and protection of 
cooperation against devolution thus pose a collective action problem that 
can only be overcome if potential cooperators come to believe with 
sufficient confidence that others within the population structure will 
respond to the vulnerabilities their cooperative acts create with reciprocal 
cooperative acts such that cooperation becomes rational.  Individuals 
develop reputations for trustworthiness over time as they demonstrate that 
they can be relied upon not to prey upon the vulnerabilities others create by 
cooperating with them, and it becomes less risky and less costly to trust 
them.97  Put in mathematical terms, trust is a judgment that any costs 
incurred by way of a lack of reciprocal cooperation by a rival will be 
compensated by the relative benefits and probability of cooperation, such 
that cooperation is rational if trust is present, and irrational if it is not. 
94. See AXELROD, supra note 37, at 83 (identifying the vulnerabilities of cooperation). 
95. See id. at 126–141 (identifying maintenance of proper incentives, promotion of reciprocity,
deepening of trust, and maintenance of connections within a population as the elements of the defense 
of cooperation).  See also RIDLEY, supra note 90, at 4 (describing the human preference for reciprocal 
trust-based cooperation as a “virtue”). 
96. KAPPELER & VAN SCHAIK, supra note 82, at 4.
97. Heymann, supra note 44, at 806. 
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Thus, without trust that cooperative acts will be reciprocated, and 
without repeated interactions in which reciprocity is possible, cooperation 
is irrational, and potential cooperators will compete instead of cooperate—
a rational outcome from the individual standpoint but collectively 
suboptimal for the population, as under these circumstances natural 
selection will extinguish cooperation as a survival strategy.98  Trust alone 
does not guarantee cooperation, as potential cooperators must still perceive 
the long-term benefits of cooperation to be greater than the short-term 
benefits of competition before they will initiate or sustain cooperation—
and this in turn rests upon the gains to be realized through cooperating, as 
well as upon the certainty and severity of punishment for failing to 
reciprocate.  However, cooperation cannot be created or preserved in the 
absence of trust, and thus the evolutionary stability of cooperation is, in 
large measure, a function of trust. 
4. The Communication of Cooperation: Using Information to Create and
Destroy Trust
a. Effect of Asymmetries of Risk
If individuals are unable to communicate their intentions regarding
cooperation, trust, and therefore cooperation, are rendered more fragile.99  
Communication allows potential cooperators to discuss their strategic 
setting and thereby reduce asymmetries of information about the benefits 
and costs associated with competition and cooperation.100  Perhaps more 
crucially, communication reduces uncertainty and risk by allowing 
potential cooperators to make promises regarding future cooperation that 
spark the origins of trust, solve the collective action problem, and induce 
cooperation.101  The corollary is also true—the absence of communication 
erects barriers to trust and, in turn, dampens cooperation.  Viewed through 
this lens, communication, defined as the exchange of information to convey 
a message or create an understanding, can be understood as a process that 
modifies trust through its effects upon the degree of uncertainty and risk 
98. See SARA SINGLETON, CONSTRUCTING COOPERATION 7 (1998) (describing a “collective action
problem” wherein trust is required to convert cooperation from an irrational to a rational strategy); 
NOWAK, supra note 88, at 269 (concluding that without repeated interactions between individuals 
where reciprocity can lead to trust, cooperation is irrational and will be eliminated by natural selection). 
99.  KAPPELER & VAN SCHAIK, supra note 82, at 275 (stating that communications about the
intentions of individuals regarding cooperation stabilizes trust and cooperation). 
100. SINGLETON, supra note 98, at 12–13. 
101. See Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, & James Walker, RULES, GAMES AND COMMON-POOL 
RESOURCES 23 (1994) (postulating that communication makes it more likely that individuals will 
commence cooperation); Boyd & Richerson, supra note 87, at 253. 
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within the relational context.102  An examination of informational theory 
aids in developing an understanding of the relationship between the 
exchange of information, trust, and cooperation. 
b. Informational Theory
Informational theory103 posits that systems tend toward disorder and
randomness—a physical state known as “entropy”104—and that external 
input, and in particular information, is necessary to overcome chaos and to 
create and maintain systemic organization, efficiency, and certainty.105  
Developed originally in the field of communications by analogies to 
mathematics and physics, informational theory has found applications in 
economics and the life sciences, where information is theorized to alter 
entropy by increasing or decreasing the efficiency and organization of 
relevant systems.106  As entities—whether natural or organizational— 
encounter information, they process and use it in an attempt to understand 
its meaning, organize the world around them, and create and protect certain 
desirable features of the systems they inhabit against chaos.  In particular, 
entities that exist in a state of interdependence can transmit and receive 
information regarding the benefits and costs of various courses of action,107 
with the most effective information transmission and usage requiring and 
contributing to certain mutual “understandings,” or common conceptions 
acquired in advance of specific communications as to what various 
symbols, signals, data, or other information means.108  Informational theory 
102. See AXELROD, supra note 37, at 173 (noting that potential cooperators “do not need words,
because their deeds speak for them”). 
103. See CLAUDE SHANNON, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM TECH. J. 
379 (1948) 
104. See generally DONALD T. HAYNIE, BIOLOGICAL THERMODYNAMICS (2001) (defining
“entropy” as the quantitative measure of disorder or uncertainty in a closed but evolving system, where 
the greater the entropy the greater the disorder or uncertainty).  The definition of entropy employed 
within information theory is related to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that entropy is 
a measure of the tendency of a process to proceed in a particular direction, that the process reduces the 
order and organization of the initial system, and that the entropy of a system always increases or 
remains constant unless energy is added to the system.  See also, DANIEL V. SCHROEDER, 
INTRODUCTION TO THERMAL PHYSICS (2000)  As used in this Article, “entropy” does not connote, as it 
does within some antitrust scholarship, a measure of market concentration.  See, e.g., J. LAWRENCE 
HEXTER & JOHN W. SNOW, AN ENTROPY MEASURE OF RELATIVE AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION, 36 
SOUTH. ECON. J. 239 (1970). 
105. See generally Jing Chen, The Informational Theory of Investment: A Comparison with
Behavioral Theories, (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=380460. 
106. Id. at 2; see also NOWAK, supra note 88, at 70 (suggesting that “biological organisms [can] be
thought of as information-processing systems.”). 
107. See, e.g., Michael Colaresi, The Benefit of the Doubt: Informational Theory of the Rally Effect, 
61 INT’L ORG. 99 (2007).
108. See, Paolo Manzelli, Entangling Information Theory, GENERAL SCI J. 1, 1 (2010).
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postulates that the more information is available, the more the information 
is anchored to available understandings, and the more information is 
exchanged, the more useful information is to entities in overcoming 
entropy and supporting the desired characteristics of the system they 
inhabit.109  As information is acquired, disseminated, and used by entities to 
develop mutual understandings regarding the organization of a system in a 
manner that supports common objectives, entropy diminishes and mutual 
welfare increases.110  As less information is exchanged, or as 
understandings regarding the organization of the system to mutual benefit 
are disrupted, entropy increases and mutual welfare decreases. 
c. Relationships Between Information, Trust, and Cooperation
As applied, informational theory, which conceptualizes information
exchange as a mechanism that modifies uncertainty, shapes mutual 
understandings, and influences the degree of organization of systems, 
postulates that as more information is exchanged between individuals 
within a population/system, particularly if it is the sort of information that 
creates mutual understandings regarding the desirability of cooperation and 
of the intent to cooperate, entropy will decrease and trust will increase, and 
with increased trust the individuals within  the population will be more 
likely to engage in and sustain acts of cooperation that contribute to the 
emergence and evolutionary stability of cooperation, along with the welfare 
advantages that pertain.  At the same time, information theory anticipates 
that as less information is exchanged, and in particular as individuals 
within the population do not communicate mutual understandings of the 
desirability of and intent to cooperate or do not abide by their agreements 
regarding the use of information to cooperate, trust decreases, and with 
decreased trust the likelihood of and evolutionary stability of cooperation 
decreases, along with the welfare of competing members. 
B. NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF THE THEORY
The proffered theory of the evolution and devolution of price cartels
parallels rational choice theory inasmuch as both treat firms’ price 
decisions—whether competitive or cooperative—as the explanandum—the 
thing to be explained—and the expected profit associated with a pricing 
109. See Chen, supra note 105, at 3. 
110. See generally ROBERT M. GRAY, ENTROPY AND INFORMATION THEORY (2009) (developing
mathematical proof that the degree of entropy in a system is inversely proportional to the amount of 
information in the system). 
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decision as the explanans—the explanatory variable.  However, beyond an 
agreement that firms seek to maximize their payoffs by selecting prices, 
and that cartels will form when the long-term payoff of cooperative pricing 
is greater than the short-term payoff of competitive pricing, the proffered 
theory and rational choice theory diverge.111 
Rational choice theory predicts that the occurrence and persistence of 
price cartels based on tacit agreements will be very rare given its 
assumption that transaction costs attending cartelization reduce and even 
eliminate the payoff premium, rendering cartels irrational. Moreover, given 
its prediction of the rarity and fragility of price cartels, rational choice 
theory is relieved of the need to delve into the process of and conditions for 
the evolution and devolution of cooperation.  Accordingly, since rational 
choice theory regards price cartels as epiphenomenal to social welfare even 
when markets are concentrated to the point of duopoly, the questions of 
whether antitrust law is effective in suppressing and destroying tacit 
agreement price cartels and, if not, what modifications to the antitrust 
regime are necessary to prevent their evolution and encourage their 
devolution, are rendered theoretically and practically irrelevant. 
In contrast, the proffered theory hypothesizes that price cartels can and 
do form and endure even in the absence of express agreements, that these 
cartels do indeed reduce social welfare, and that the enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement of laws to prevent their evolution and 
promote their devolution affords utility to regulators and consumer welfare 
advocates.  Central to informational theory is the informational context that 
intervenes between price decisions and payoffs and in which firms interact 
strategically.  This informational context provides the setting and the 
opportunity for firms to reach and communicate, whether directly or 
indirectly, a set of understandings and tacit agreements as to their 
preferences for and interest in cooperation, their intent to price 
cooperatively or competitively, the actions that may legitimately be taken 
to monitor pricing decisions, the penalties for violating agreements, the 
likely responses of third parties to the exchange of information, and how 
such responses will alter payoffs and, in turn, pricing decisions.  So long as 
the long-term benefits of cooperation exceed the short-term benefits of 
competition, and so long as these understandings and agreements endure, 
informational theory predicts that firms will generate and sustain the trust 
necessary for the evolution and preservation of cooperation, 
supracompetitive pricing, and corresponding high payoffs.  However, if 
payoffs are altered such that the short-term benefits of competition exceed 
111. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century, 
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007) (outlining the rational choice theory regarding price cartels). 
 Summer 2012 PRICE CARTELS 313 
the long-term benefits of cooperation, or if trust is destroyed through the 
disruption of understandings or the violation of agreements—whether 
through information gathering that transcends the permissible scope, 
deviation from expected pricing decisions, state intervention, or some other 
mechanism, informational theory predicts that the price cartel will devolve 




The proffered informational theory of the evolution and devolution of
price cartels hypothesizes that the expected payoff to the firm, measured as 
the total profit to the firm minus any monitoring costs and any regulatory 
fines or penalties, is the independent variable (“IV”). 
2. Dependent Variable
The proffered informational theory of the evolution and devolution of
price cartels hypothesizes that the price decision of the firm, measured as 
either competitive (low) or cooperative (high), is the dependent variable 
(“DV”). 
3. Intervening Variable
The proposed informational theory of the evolution and devolution of
price cartels hypothesizes that the informational context in which firms 
conclude and communicate understandings and tacit agreements as to their 
preferences for and interest in cooperation, their intent to price 
cooperatively or competitively, the actions that may legitimately be taken 
to monitor pricing decisions, the penalties for violating agreements, the 
likely responses of third-parties to the exchange of information, how such 
responses will alter payoffs and pricing decisions, and the substance of 
those understandings and agreements, facilitates a better understanding of 
the causal relationship between the intervening variable (“IV”) and DV and 
is thus specified as in intervening variable for purposes of theory 
development and testing.112 
112. For a definition of the concept of “intervening variable” and its utility in the development and
testing of theories, see, e.g., K. McCorquodale & Paul E. Meehl, On A Distinction Between 
Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables, 55 PSYCH. REV. 95 (1948).
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D. WORKING POSTULATES
The following working postulates are specified as the elements of an
information theory of the evolution and devolution of price cartels: 
Firms are analogous to natural organisms in that they struggle to 
survive in competition against firms; 
Survival of the fittest applies to firms, with fitness measured in profits; 
Firms are rational, and thus seek to maximize profits through their 
pricing decisions; 
The struggle for survival dictates that competition, expressed through 
competitive pricing decisions, is the strategy for firms ab initio regardless 
of the degree of market concentration; 
Mutual cooperation in pricing decisions by firms yields greater 
individual and collective profits than mutual competition; 
Unreciprocated cooperation in pricing decisions by firms yields the 
lowest possible profit to the sole cooperator, thus rendering cooperation 
riskier than competition; 
Pricing decisions communicate firms’ desire for and strategic interest 
in cooperation; 
Price-fixing agreements are unlawful and unenforceable, and thus 
pricing decisions are uncertain and neither perfectly nor immediately 
transparent; 
Trust is the confidence that the expected profit from cooperation, 
given the probability of reciprocation and the cost of being the sole 
cooperator; is greater than its profit from competition, thereby rendering it 
rational to shift from competitive pricing to cooperative pricing; 
To initiate cooperation, a firm must develop sufficient trust that its 
rival will reciprocate; 
Cooperation is possible when trust is sufficient to permit the first firm 
to shift from competitive pricing to cooperative pricing; 
Price cartels evolve when trust is sufficient to permit mutual 
cooperative price decisions; 
Firms seek information about past and future pricing decisions of rival 
firms when assessing whether to trust their rivals and whether to initiate or 
continue cooperation; 
Members of price cartels conclude tacit agreements regarding the 
permissible means, methods, and scope of the acquisition and transmission 
of information regarding pricing decisions, and information gathering 
consistent with these agreements support and develop trust; 
Adherence to tacit agreements regarding the acquisition and 
transmission of information regarding pricing decisions communicates an 
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intent to continue cooperation and builds trust, whereas violations of tacit 
agreements regarding the acquisition of information regarding pricing 
decisions communicates an intent to discontinue cooperation and destroys 
trust; 
As mutual cooperation persists, trust increases, and as trust increases, 
the probabilities of mutual cooperation, individual and joint profits, and 
survival increases; conversely, as cooperation is unreciprocated, trust 
decreases, and as trust decreases, the probabilities of mutual cooperation, 
individual and joint profits, and survival decreases; 
Cooperation ends when any firm determines that it can no longer trust 
its rival; 
Competition resumes when trust is insufficient to support mutual 
cooperative price decisions; 
Absent trust, the evolution and endurance of price cartels requires 
unlawful express price-fixing agreements; 
Absent either trust or express price-fixing agreements, price cartels 
devolve toward competition and competitive pricing, and consumer surplus 
and social welfare increase. 
IV. CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF PRICE CARTELS:
HEURISTIC TESTING OF THE THEORY 
A. SCENARIO: DEWEYCHEATHAM OIL V. ENHOWE OIL
1. Phase One: Competition
By the spring of 2012, a wave of consolidations within the global
petroleum industry, prompted by the rising costs of exploration and 
recovery of diminishing petroleum reserves in politically unstable regions 
and opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies and profit margins, results 
in a duopoly in which two firms, DeweyCheatham Oil and EnHowe Oil, 
come to supply over ninety percent of raw crude, refined gas, and fuel 
additives to the U.S. market, as well as a significant majority of these 
homogeneous commodity goods to other world regional markets.  For the 
first several months of the duopoly market, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe 
each employ a strategy that includes the aggressive purchase of new and 
existing leases, refineries, and logistics capacities to significantly increase 
production of automotive gasoline, and each competitively prices in an 
attempt to expand supply and gain market share from the other.  Consumers 
benefit from the “Great Gas War” as gas prices declined from their 2011 
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nationwide average highs of $3.99 per gallon to settle at $1.70 per gallon.113 
Meanwhile, although committed to aggressive price competition in the 
U.S. gasoline market, each firm continues to labor to produce new fuel 
additives that might differentiate their gasoline and earn even greater 
market share and profits.  After nearly ten years of research at a cost of 
over $10 billion, petroleum engineers at DeweyCheatham’s Research and 
Technology Facility in Houston, Texas, are making great strides in 
developing a fuel additive named “Formula K2” using kelp, krill, and 
advanced genetic engineering and bionanotechnology that has the prospect 
to increase the chemical potential energy of gasoline, and with it the fuel 
efficiency of gasoline-powered vehicles, by nearly thirty percent.114  Their 
counterparts at EnHowe’s Research and Technology Facility in Long 
Beach, California, are using a precursor of cold fusion to synthesize 
complex artificial hydrocarbon chains out of agricultural waste and thereby 
create an additive, called “Frozen Chain,” to the same end.  Neither project, 
which each firm protects as a trade secret, is yet ready for market, and 
neither firm has yet patented its intellectual property, although rumors of 
both projects are widely reported in trade publications. 
Although both firms have a long history of delving into the gray zone 
of CI to gather information about the exploration, research, marketing, and 
pricing decisions of their rival, never has either engaged in clear EE attacks 
against the other.  Nevertheless, to protect their trade secrets in what each 
expects to confer a vast competitive advantage over its rival, 
DeweyCheatham’s Threat Research and Assessment Group (“TRAG”) and 
EnHowe’s Opposition Research and Analysis Group (“ORAG”)—
organizations within their respective DCIs responsible for information 
security—expand and intensify their defensive CI efforts as the additives 
projects develop.  TRAG and ORAG increase the monitoring of employees 
and computers, intensify surveillance of key scientific personnel, and 
conduct periodic “secrecy seminars” to retrain employees firmwide in the 
detection of and protection against dumpster diving for documents that 
113. This calculation assumes that (1) if the relationship between supply and demand prevailing in
2002 were restored through an increase in supply to offset increased demand by developing countries, 
(2) if the risk premium were reduced to 2002 levels by a reduction in unrest in the Middle East, and (3)
if the currency in which oil prices are denominated—the U.S. dollar—was not beset by pressure due to
structural debt obligations, quantitative easing, and government borrowing that triggers additional
inflation, then inflation-adjusted average gasoline price nationwide in 2002—$1.31 per gallon—would
yield a 2012 price of $1.70 per gallon.  See Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_
publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html (listing historical U.S. gasoline prices).
114. Although current fuel additives extend engine life and performance, none contribute
significantly to fuel efficiency.  See KEITH OWEN, GASOLINE AND DIESEL FUEL ADDITIVES, 164 (1999).  
For a discussion of the physics involved in the use of gasoline as fuel, see PAUL TIPLER, PHYSICS FOR 
SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 575 (1999).
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evade shredding, theft of laptops and documents from hotel rooms and 
airport security, interception of cellular phone conversations, 
eavesdropping and electronic surveillance in hotels and airports, and other 
common CI and EE methods.115 
2. Phase Two: Cooperation
By the fall of 2012, both firms, eager to offset sunk R&D costs, begin
to gradually raise prices, with a price increase by one firm swiftly followed 
by a price increase by the other.  Neither firm directly communicates its 
intentions regarding price  to its rival, but increased prices all along the 
supply chain—from traders to distributors and ultimately at the pump—are 
rapidly disseminated by consumers through various media, including 
internet websites.116 and the secretive Department of Competitive 
Intelligence  (“DCI”) at each firm labors to keep close track of its rival’s 
pricing decisions.  By January 2013, the nationwide average price for a 
gallon of regular unleaded gasoline is $5.10—exactly triple what it had 
been less than one year before, and throughout the remainder of 2013 
prices fluctuate around this $5.10 price median.  Gas stations operated or 
supplied by both firms located in the same geographic areas uniformly 
charge identical, or near-identical prices, and the trend-line slopes sharply 
upward; on the rare occasion when one firm reduces prices, the other 
swiftly follows, and within days the prices for both firms return to the 
previous high and continue increasing.  Consumer anger over gasoline 
“price gouging” returns to 2011 levels as in their 2012 financial reports 
DeweyCheatham and EnHowe each report total market capitalization of 
over $300 billion, revenues of nearly $300 billion, and profits of $20 
billion—the latter a twenty percent increase over the previous year.117  
Despite several requests by members of Congress and consumer groups, 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice takes no action, 
however.  An executive decision to release thirty million barrels of 
petroleum from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has no effect whatsoever 
115. See, e.g., Robert L. Tucker, Industrial Espionage as Unfair Competition, 29 U. TOL. L. REV.
245, 245–46 (describing defensive training seminars provided by firms to its employees to protect 
against EE by rivals).
116. See, e.g., GAS BUDDY, http://www.gasbuddy.com, (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (providing real-
time information on prevailing gas prices nationwide).
117. The reported financial data for ExxonMobil—the largest private-sector petroleum firm
supplying the U.S. market with a seventeen percent market share—is extrapolated and used as the basis 
for determining the market capitalization, revenue, and profits of the fictional firms DeweyCheatham 
and EnHowe, duopolists that each have a fifty percent share of the U.S. market in the hypothetical 
scenario.  See 2010 Financial Statements, EXXON-MOBIL, http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/ 
Files/news_pub_ ir_financial_2010.pdf 
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on price,118 and a legislative proposal to repeal subsidies for exploration by 
petroleum firms, increase taxes on petroleum firms, and criminalize the 
“manipulation” of oil markets—defined as the practice of “fuel price 
gouging” whether by firms or “speculators—is defeated in Congress.119 
3. Phase Three: Defection
In February 2013, TRAG discovers a sophisticated Trojan horse
program on a Project K2 mainframe computer that subsequent forensic 
investigation reveals has been capturing and transmitting sensitive 
documents and data, including formulas, manufacturing processes, and 
anticipated project milestone dates, for at least two months.120  Careful not 
to reveal their discovery, TRAG investigators quietly follow the electronic 
trail and discover a safe house in suburban Houston being used by ORAG 
to run an extensive EE operation.  Several weeks of clandestine 
investigation and damage assessment reveals three more items of 
unwelcome information: (1) the EE attack by EnHowe is led by a former 
TRAG employee who, prior to his termination the previous summer, was 
able to transmit coded information about Project K2 formulas to 
EnHowe;121 (2) an academic publication by a Project K2 genetic engineer, 
118. See Robert Bamberger & Robert Pirog, The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Possible Effects on
Gasoline Prices of Selected Fill Products, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. (Sept. 27, 2004), 
available at  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32358.pdf (predicting that release of petroleum out of the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve would have such minimal effects on supply that effects on price of 
gasoline would be near-zero).
119. See Taxpayer and Gas Price Relief Act, H.R. 1748, 112th Cong. (referred to House
Subcommittee on Energy and Resources, May 16, 2011) (providing penalties of up to $500 million per 
violation).  A vote on cutting $21 billion in subsidies was defeated on May 11, 2011.  See Chaddock 
Gail, Senate Blocks Big Oil Windfall Profits Tax Bill, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 11, 
2008), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2008/0611/p25s13-usec.html.
120. EEA cases are almost invariably initiated when the targeted firm discovers the theft of its trade
secrets through internal investigations.  Rustad, supra note 59, at 494–95. Such thefts are often 
perpetrated through cybercriminal techniques, including the use of computer programs, known as 
“malware,” to collect intellectual property.  See generally C. BURGESS, SECRETS STOLEN, FORTUNES 
LOST: PREVENTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2008). 
121. Employees with special access and advanced professional subject matter expertise are the
misappropriators of trade secrets in a significant fraction of EEA prosecutions. See Rustad, supra note 
59, at 494 (surveying cases and noting that the defendant was an outsider in only 13 of 48 EEA 
prosecutions); see also United States. v. Kai-Lo Hsu, supra note 69 (convicting an engineer under 
Section 1832(a)(4) (attempting to steal a trade secret) and Section 1832(a)(5) (conspiring to steal a trade 
secret) when he approached an undercover FBI agent mistakenly believing the FBI agent was an 
information broker to whom he could sell his firm’s trade secrets); United States v. Thomas Kissane, 
No. 1:02CR626 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (defendant convicted under EEA for sending e-mail messages to two 
of his employer’s rivals offering to sell source codes for computerized trade secrets);  United States v. 
Branch and Erskine, No. 03-M-1453 (C.D. Calif.) (charging former managers with theft of Lockheed 
Martin trade secrets); United States v. Case, 2007 WL 1746399 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (charging departing 
employees who formed their own firm with theft of trade secrets under EEA).  Terminated or 
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who moonlights as an adjunct professor in the biology department at the 
University of Houston and is now under suspicion as an EnHowe mole,122 
was improperly vetted by TRAG prior to publication in a peer-reviewed 
scientific journal, and as a result an important theoretical discovery 
regarding the basic science behind Project K2 is now in the public 
domain;123 and (3) gray zone CI conducted by DeweyCheatham’s DCI 
against EnHowe indicates that EnHowe may be ready to rush an earlier 
generation fuel additive to market in the next two months that, based on 
reverse engineering of a small sample deceptively obtained from an 
EnHowe distributor by DCI personnel impersonating potential wholesale 
customers—means arguably unethical but not unlawful—appears to have 
been formulated based in part on DeweyCheatham research.124 
After two days of intense round-the-clock meetings of senior 
executives, TRAG, and outside legal counsel in which alternatives are 
raised, discussed, wargamed, and analyzed, DeweyCheatham’s CEO issues 
a confidential ultimatum to his counterpart at EnHowe demanding EnHowe 
undertake the following: (1) fire all ORAG executives responsible for the 
EE attack, (2) disband ORAG, (3) return all trade secret information 
misappropriated from DeweyCheatham, (4) permit TRAG to interview 
disgruntled former employees are a particular risk.  See, e.g., Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 56 , at 
417 (discussing former employees’ motives for committing EE).  A frequent EE method involves 
“poaching” of employees valued for their capacity to transmit their former employers’ trade secrets to 
the poaching firms either in physical form or through their memories.  See Richard Waters, Not Spying, 
Just Hiring, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at 7 (reporting that GE attempted to gain knowledge of Dow 
Chemical’s manufacturing process, design, and marketing initiatives by hiring fourteen Dow employees 
to similar jobs at GE where they would use their recollections of Dow’s trade secrets).  Whether 
liability extends under the EEA to employee poaching is unclear, but where there is evidence that the 
poaching firm intends to misappropriate trade secrets liability can attach.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding criminal liability under the EEA based in part on 
transmission of a “smoking gun” e-mail containing purloined trade secrets between the exiting 
employee and a manager in the poaching corporation).
122. “Moles” are spies hired for the express purpose of gaining employment in and access to the
secrets of a rival firm. 
123. Professors engaged in academic research who consult to or work for firms develop and possess
valuable theoretical and applied information, and in the process of publishing the results of their 
research can unintentionally or intentionally divulge information that either ipso facto constitutes a 
trade secret or that, combined with other information, may allow a rival to acquire trade secrets.  See 
Jennings & Tomkies, supra note 60, at 242 (warning against the theft of intellectual property during the 
academic peer review process).  Although universities and faculty are committed to “the traditions of 
open research and prompt transmission of research results[,]” firms have a corresponding commitment 
to pre-publication verification that the research of faculty whom they employ does not contain trade 
secrets; these interests are in tension.  Id. at 244–59. 
124. The EEA prohibits certain methods of reverse engineering—the unauthorized process whereby
a second-comer learns the process or structure of an innovation by deconstruction, analysis, and 
duplication—including “decompilation” of computer programs, “sketching, drawing, or photographing” 
trade secrets in publicly sold goods, chemical analysis, and rote memorization; however, examining a 
lawfully acquired product to determine its content is not per se unlawful.  See Pooley et al., supra note 
61, at 185–87 (discussing reverse engineering under the EEA). 
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EnHowe employees to ascertain the extent of the misappropriation, (5) 
cease development of any and all fuel additive projects for a period of two 
years, (6) permit a third-party investigator to review EnHowe data to 
ensure that future EnHowe products and strategies were not based upon the 
misappropriated trade secrets, (7) pay an indemnity of $5 billion 
(DeweyCheatham’s internal valuation of the trade secrets stolen by 
EnHowe), and (8) resign effective immediately.125  The ultimatum specified 
that refusal to accept it as the basis for a private and confidential settlement 
within seven days would result in DeweyCheatham referring the matter to 
the FBI for criminal prosecution under the EEA.  On the final day to accept 
DeweyCheatham’s ultimatum, EnHowe’s CEO telephones her counterpart 
to protest his “outrageous demands,” imply that the EE attack was 
“unauthorized,” and request additional time for “amicable negotiations” so 
the two firms can avoid “a destructive cycle of retaliation and counter-
retaliation.”  DeweyCheatham does not respond.  Within days, the first of a 
series of price cuts by DeweyCheatham are followed, albeit with some 
hesitation, by EnHowe. 
4. Phase Four: Sanction
Three mornings later, FBI agents swarm the EnHowe corporate
campus with search warrants to seize all information—business records, 
documents, computers, chemicals, email traffic, computers—as evidence in 
support of an indictment that is simultaneously unsealed in the District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas charging EnHowe and seven 
EnHowe employees with conspiracy to steal trade secrets and theft of trade 
secrets regarding Project K2 under Section 1832(b) of the EEA.  FBI 
agents arrest the seven indicted employees and detain others for 
questioning as witnesses.  In a press release, the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
(“AUSA”) announces that government will be seeking prison time, fines, 
and civil restitution.126  Later that afternoon, the AUSA requests and 
receives an order protecting the confidentiality of information regarding the 
prosecution of the case against EnHowe under Section 1836. 
Within days, although neither fuel additive project is complete, both 
firms begin adding derivatives of their respective projects to the gasoline 
125. The elements of the ultimatum in this fictional scenario track closely with the demands made
by Unilever to reach a private settlement with Procter & Gamble in lieu of an EEA prosecution when 
the latter firm undertook EE against Unilever in 2002.  For a discussion of this case, see A. Neela 
Radhika & A. Mukund, Procter & Gamble vs. Unilever—A Case of Corporate Espionage, ICMR 
CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT RESEARCH (2003), available at http://www.icmrindia.org/casestudies/ 
catalogue/Business%20Ethics/BECG036.htm.
126. See generally Louis A Karasik, Under the Economic Espionage Act, 48 FED. LAW. 34, 37
(2001) (elaborating on the mechanics of federal procedure as it pertains to prosecution of an EEA case). 
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they supply in an attempt to capture market share and to arrest the drop in 
price.  However, although the efficiency of gasoline spikes noticeably, both 
firms remain locked in a price war, and by the summer of 2013 gas is once 
again under $2.00 per gallon.  As discovery accelerates in the criminal case 
against EnHowe and EnHowe demands discovery from DeweyCheatham 
as to the specific nature of the trade secrets EnHowe is alleged to have 
misappropriated, the share price of DeweyCheatham stock falls to a fifty-
two week low, and publications and blogs fault DeweyCheatham’s “failure 
to protect its trade secrets,” rather than the alleged EE attack by EnHowe, 
as the reason for the collapse in DeweyCheatham’s firm value.  A week 
before Thanksgiving 2013, as the nationwide average price of a gallon of 
unleaded regular gasoline falls to $1.70, a jury convicts all EnHowe 
defendants on all charges.  At sentencing, individual defendants receive 
prison sentences ranging from six months to eighteen months.  EnHowe is 
fined $5 million—the maximum available under the EEA—and ordered to 
pay civil restitution in the amount of an additional $5 million. 
5. Phase Five: Collusion
In July 2014, at the EnHowe Annual Shareholders Meeting in Las
Vegas, the CEO of DeweyCheatham makes a surprise appearance with the 
new CEO of EnHowe to announce the initiation of a joint fuel additives 
research and development program that will “significantly improve the 
efficiency of gasoline” while “reducing duplicative efforts and eliminating 
the pressures toward unethical conduct, and increasing the value that both 
firms are able to provide to consumers.”  Gas prices trend upward, as do 
the share prices of both firms, and as a gallon once again eclipses $4.00 
investigators and attorneys with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., noisily open a preliminary 
investigation. 
6. Phase Six: Prosecution
On the Tuesday after Memorial Day 2015, with the price of a gallon
of gas at nearly $6.00 per gallon, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
for the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DAAG”) 
holds a press conference, broadcast live by scores of networks from the 
Washington, D.C. Headquarters building, to announce the following: 
After an investigation of over six months’ duration, during which time 
it has cooperated to render a full exposition of the facts and to assist in 
developing the case against its co-conspirator, DeweyCheatham has entered 
into an Agreement under the Corporate Leniency Program in connection 
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with a criminal conspiracy to fix the price of gasoline in the United States 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.127  DeweyCheatham has 
entered into this Agreement and agreed to make restitution of $25 billion in 
exchange for a promise from this office not to prosecute or to levy fines. 
The Corporate Leniency Program presented DeweyCheatham and its co-
conspirator with a golden opportunity—no criminal conviction and no fines 
to the firm that raced in first and provided evidence against the other. 
DeweyCheatham made the right decision in abandoning its pattern of 
wrongdoing and aiding this office in its work on behalf of consumers.128 
In a separate announcement issued the next day, the DAAG announces 
the filing of criminal and civil complaints against EnHowe alleging a 
“combination and conspiracy to fix the price of gasoline” at a 
supracompetitive level “with the result that the price of gasoline in the 
United States has been fixed and maintained for over two years and that 
competition has been restrained, suppressed and eliminated.”  The 
complaints seek $100 billion in fines against EnHowe—the largest ever 
sought in an antitrust complaint by orders of magnitude129—which 
represents, in the estimation of the DAAG, twice the gain from the illegal 
activity and twice the loss suffered by consumers. Within days, class 
actions are filed against EnHowe on behalf of consumer groups demanding 
a total of nearly $150 billion in damages.130 
127. See U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/criminal/239524.htm. 
128. This language parallels policy statements by the former DAAG.  See, e.g., Scott D. Hammond,
Recent Development Related to the Antitrust Divison’s Corporate Leniency Program, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 
244840.htm. 
129.  18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).  The largest fine a firm has been sentenced to pay to date is $500 million.
United States v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd., Cr. No. 99-CR-184-R (N.D. Tex. May 20, 1999) 
(judgment and plea agreement).  The fine imposed is generally a multiple of twenty percent of the 
volume of commerce affected; the multiplier, which ranges from 0.75 to 4.0, is determined by 
considering certain characteristics of the offense, including the size of the firm, whether the firm was 
the ringleader of the conspiracy, whether high-level employees led the conspiracy, whether there was an 
effective compliance program, and whether the firm had prior antitrust violations.  U.S.S.G. §§ 2R1.1, 
8C2 (Nov. 2002).  All cartel members may be jointly and severally liable for all price-fixing committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Id. 
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (permitting individuals harmed as a result of the criminal act to
sue for damages of up to three times actual damages).  Firms that do not confess first are liable for 
treble damages both severally and jointly in subsequent private lawsuits, with damages in private price-
fixing suits based on the “but-for” price of the affected goods or services and the injury to plaintiffs 
represented by the difference between the price actually paid and the price the plaintiffs would have 
paid but for the defendant’s price-fixing.  New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d 1065, 1077 (2d 
Cir. 1988).  DeweyCheatham is liable solely for damages caused by its conduct as a result of its 
Agreement under the CLP. Additional advantages to first confessors under the CLP include avoidance 
of costs incurred as a result of prosecution, including disruption of business, loss of employees’ time, 
financial costs of defending against criminal charges, and further reputational harm.  Leslie, Antitrust 
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Gas prices fall almost immediately, and by September 2015, shortly 
before trial commences, EnHowe enters into an agreement whereby it 
pleads guilty to all charges and pays a fine of $80 billion.  Civil suits are 
settled as well, and the refund checks consumers receive stimulate the U.S. 
economy.  Later that fall, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe introduce K2 and 
Frozen Chain with intense advertising campaigns that spark a new price 
war; by Christmas, gas stabilizes at just over $2.00 per gallon, and, as I. 
Ned Gass is thrilled to discover on his next visit to Utopia, that gallon 
provides thirty percent greater fuel efficiency than the previous generation 
of gasoline. 
B. METHODOLOGY: GAME THEORY
1. Introduction
Game theory (“GT”) is an analytical heuristic that assists in the
rigorous development and testing of explanatory and predictive theories of 
conflict and cooperation in social science131 by “provid[ing] an account of 
what behavior to expect in a strategic interaction,” where a strategic 
interaction is defined as one “in which the actors’ resulting welfare is a 
function not only of their own actions but of those of others as well.”132  
Specifically, GT is a branch of mathematics that sharpens logic and “hones 
. . . intuition by illuminating the basic forces that are at work by not plainly 
visible” when entities seek to predict and shape the reaction of other 
entities to their decisions, including the possibility of cooperation and the 
role of legal sanctions in structuring decisions and outcomes of decisions.133 
Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 458. 
131. Developed in the late 1940s, game theory was quickly identified as the “most promising
mathematical tool yet devised for the analysis of man’s social relations.”  Lewis Fry Richardson, 
Commentary on the Social Application of Mathematics, in THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICS 1264, 1264 
(1956).  In the last sixty years, game theory has found application as a method of theory development 
and analysis in a wide variety of behavioral fields, including political science, economics, and law.  See 
R.J. Aumann, Game Theory, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 460, 460–79 
(John Eatwell et al., eds., 1987) (identifying the various fields in which game theory has made 
contributions in theory building and testing).
132. Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa, Strategic Coordination and the Law, 26 L. & PHIL. 
501, 505 (2007).
133. Id. at 509–10. 
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2. Elements of Games
a. Players
“Players” are the entities—natural persons, groups of natural persons,
or firms—that exist in a closed system and must interact strategically with 
other players to achieve payoffs. 
b. Actions
“Actions” are the choices from among options players must make in
order to maximize their expected payoffs.134 
c. Payoffs
“Payoffs” are the objective consequences of strategies, measured in
utility which can be but is not necessarily monetary. 
d. Information
“Information” is knowledge about the strategies other players are
likely to use, about expected payoffs associated with various strategies, 
about the strategies other players chose previously, and about how strategic 
interactions between players have influenced payoffs.135 
134. When a single strategy is best for a player regardless of what the other player does, it is called
a “pure” strategy.  BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.  A “dominant strategy” is the optimal strategy for 
a player to choose irrespective of the strategy chosen by the other player(s).  Id. 
135. See Almendares & Landa, supra note 132, at 511 (describing the significance of information
regarding “prior strategic interaction” to players).  A “perfect” information game, also known as a “C” 
game (for complete information), implies that players know all that is necessary to determine available 
actions, payoffs, and periods, whereas an “imperfect” or “incomplete” information game (also known as 
an “I” game), is such that players lack some or all of this information.  DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, 
at 20–24.  An “asymmetric” information game is characterized by an informational differential between 
players, whether by design or by the successful efforts of one or more players to conceal information, 
mislead other players, or convey private information selectively.  Id.  Uncertainty is intrinsic to many 
games, and manipulation of available information, and attempts to force better-informed players to 
reveal their information, are strategies that often correspond with desirable payoffs.  See Greenberg, 
supra note 44, at 139 (1982) (discussing the utility of and protection against deception in strategic 
interactions). 
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e. Periods
“Periods” are the units of time or turns in which the length of the
game is measured—either one unit, multiple units, an uncertain or 
unknown number of units, or an infinite number. 
f. Strategies
“Strategies” are “complete contingency plan[s] for picking [actions] as 
the game and information about the game develop.”136 
g. Solutions
A “solution” for a game—also known as an “equilibrium”—is a
conjunction of players’ strategies such that each is playing its “best 
strategy” where a best strategy is that strategy that maximizes its individual 
payoff.137  A “Nash equilibrium” is a solution in which no player can 
improve its expected payoff by unilaterally switching to a different strategy 
while holding fixed the strategy(ies) of the other player(s).138  A game can 
have zero, one, or multiple solutions. 
3. Assumptions
GT assumes the following: (1) players are rational;139 (2) aspects of
the strategic context not specified in the game are equivalent for all 
players;140 (3) explanations and predictions are sensitive to the way the 
game is designed and in particular the method whereby payoffs are 
determined;141 (4) games can model a complex strategic interaction with 
136. Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 285,
289–90 (1991).
137. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Origins of the Game Theory of Law and the Limits of Harmony in
Plato’s Laws, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1335, 1398 (1998) (defining “equilibrium”). An equilibrium is a 
function of the available strategies and payoffs which are in turn determined by the game designer.  Id.  
It predicts the combination of strategies that rational players will select.  Id. 
138. A “Nash equilibrium” occurs when each player’s strategy is a best response to the other
players’ best responses.  DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 11 (1991). 
139. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 4 (1994) 
(defining a “rational” player as one who is “aware of his alternatives, forms expectations about any 
unknowns, has clear preferences, and chooses his actions deliberately by some process of 
maximization”).  In ascribing rationality to players, GT does not make evaluative judgments as to 
whether players’ objectives are desirable. Almendares & Landa, supra note 132, at 505. 
140. See Shubik, supra note 136, at 292 (describing the “external symmetry” assumption). 
141. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV.
411, 412 (1997) (indicating that empirical measures or proxies must be developed to specify payoffs).  
Game theorists “act like gods” in creating the game, and in particular in specifying payoffs, and to the 
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relatively few elements without losing significant explanatory and 
predictive power;142 (5) explanations and predictions are contingent rather 
than deterministic; (6) games are “self-contained” (payoffs and strategies 
are not linked to the existence of other games) unless otherwise 
specified;143 (7) players have symmetric and perfect information unless 
otherwise specified; and (8) games depend upon the existence of non-
players to enforce the rules that limit strategies and payoffs.144  Although 
GT incorporates these assumptions, it nevertheless provides a rigorous 
method for analyzing strategic principles and the decisions entities make as 
they interact within their environment,145 and the explanations and 
predictions it offers retain significant power even when these assumptions 
are relaxed.146 
C. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF DEWEYCHEATHAM V. ENHOWE
1. Competition: The Single-Shot Prisoners’ Dilemma
During the “Competition” phase, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe,
despite having created a duopoly market, engaged in aggressive price 
competition, sacrificing the short-term profits available from 
supracompetitive pricing in favor of a price war each fought in the hope of 
securing a larger future market share.  Simultaneously, each invested in the 
development of intellectual property in an effort to differentiate its product 
from that of its rival in the hope of earning future price premia for products 
the market would recognize as superior to earlier formulas of gasoline.  
Neither trusted the other, as their information security precautions attested, 
nor was trust necessary in the context of fierce competition, and consumers 
benefited accordingly from low prices.  The Single-Shot Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (“SSPD”)—a game that models the circumstances under which 
entities will collaborate and under which they will choose to maximize self- 
 
extent that payoffs do not fairly and accurately represents the benefits and costs to the players of various 
actions, the theorist can influence the results of the game in a manner that dilutes its usefulness to the 
objectives of rendering explanations and predictions of player behavior.  Jacobson, supra note 137, at 
1399. 
142. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 7.   Although GT “suppresses details concerning process and
information” to “deal with the big picture,” the relationship between actions, strategies, and payoffs is 
useful for building and testing theories.  Shubik, supra note 137, at 290. 
143. See William J. Edelman, The Benefit of Spying: Defining the Boundaries of Economic
Espionage under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 63 STAN. L. REV. 447, 458–59 (2010) 
(elaborating the “self-contained” assumption). 
144. Jacobson, supra note 137, at 1398. 
145. Heil et al., supra note 7, at 129. 
146. David Sally, Game Theory Behaves, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 783, 784 (2004). 
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interest at the expense of others—is useful in explaining the strategic 
interaction during “Competition.” 
a. Game Description: SSPD
In the SSPD game, two self-interested players simultaneously choose
strategies and receive payoffs determined by the intersection of strategies. 
Although each player can gain by the strategy of “cooperation,” defined as 
collaborating with the other player to achieve common gains, the strategy 
of “defection,” or betraying the other player, is dominant for each.  Thus, if 
the SSPD cooperation fails, then each player ends up worse off than if he 
had cooperated and pursued joint interests instead of his own.  Consider the 
classic example: two suspects, A and B, are arrested for a major crime and 
a minor crime by the police, who have insufficient evidence to convict 
either of the major crime but enough to convict on the lesser charge.  The 
police, having physically separated both prisoners, visit each to offer the 
same deal: if one “defects” and testifies for the prosecution against the 
other while the other “cooperates” and remains silent, the defector goes 
free on both charges and the cooperator is convicted of the major crime and 
receives the full ten year sentence.  If both cooperate and remain silent, 
both are sentenced to only six months on the lesser charge.  If each defects 
and betrays the other, each receives a two-year sentence for the major 
crime.  Each prisoner must decide whether to defect or to cooperate.147  
However, neither can be certain what choice the other will make, and they 
cannot communicate with the other. 
b. Payoffs: Standard SSPD Game
The SSPD game can be summarized in a matrix where the row
player’s payoff is listed first and the column player’s payoff is listed 
second in each cell, and the smaller the payoff the lower the sentence and 
the greater the value to the player: 
147. The PD game assumes that players do not necessarily know their choice of strategies and
actions at the beginning of the game but must decide based on the payoffs and their estimation of the 
other player’s strategies and actions. 
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Silent .5, .5 10, 0 
Confess 0, 10 2, 2
Analysis of the payoffs reveals that each prisoner desires for the other 
to remain silent (cooperate) while he confesses (defects) so that he can go 
free, yet both know that if each confesses they will receive two-year 
sentences—a reduction from the most severe sentence granted in light of 
the willingness to provide incriminating information but a worse outcome 
than the cooperative outcome of six-month sentences when both remain 
silent.148  The cooperative outcome is Pareto optimal—any other decision 
would be worse for the two prisoners considered together—but unstable, 
because neither can be sure that the other will not defect in the hope of 
escaping punishment entirely and forcing the other to serve ten years.149  As 
each prisoner further scrutinizes his own payoffs he discovers that, 
although he would like to remain silent and have the other prisoner remain 
silent, the fact is that, no matter what the other does, each prisoner is better 
off confessing.  With confession being the strongly dominant strategy for 
each prisoner, the solution is a Pareto inferior Nash equilibrum in which 
each prisoner will always confess and receive a longer sentence than if 
neither confessed, and each is thus worse off than he could be had both 
been able to cooperate and remain silent.  In other words, the SSPD creates 
an inescapable dilemma in which a better solution—each prisoner serves a 
six month sentence—is available than the one that rational self-interested 
players will choose—each prisoner serves a two year sentence—if only 
both could trust each other enough to cooperate in shifting from the 
Confess-Confess outcome to the Silent-Silent outcome.  Although the 
prisoners are in a state of interdependence, benefits to defection defeat 
cooperation, and the individually rational actions of the prisoners produce a  
148. The payoffs are often labeled as follows: “S” for “Sucker’s Payoff” earned for confessing
while the other player is silent; “T” is for “Temptation” to remain silent while the other player 
confesses; “R” is the payoff when both players “Resist” the urge to confess and remain silent; and “P” 
is for “Punishment” when both players confess.  Accordingly, in the standard PD, T > R > P > S. 
 NOWAK, supra note 88, at 8. 
149. The credible threat of severe punishment—which is not always available—may be necessary to
reinforce the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in the PD game.   BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 173. 
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suboptimal and inefficient outcome both individually and collectively in 
terms of the prisoners’ welfare.150 
c. Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. Enhowe During Competition
Applying the insights of the SSPD to the interaction of
DeweyCheatham and EnHowe during “Competition” results in the 
following matrix, which assumes that no other firms can enter the market 
for gasoline, that customers buy solely based on price, that both firms make 
pricing decisions simultaneously without communication,151 sell a 
homogeneous product, have the same costs, and only charge one of two 
prices—“Low Price” (the competitive price) or “High Price” (the 
supracompetitive price):152 
Single-Shot Prisoners’ Dilemma: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During 
Competition 
EnHowe 




Price ½ D, ½ D D – E, E 
High 
Price E, D – E ½ C, ½ C 
150. Without incentives to defect, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not a dilemma, and cooperation is a
“no brainer.”  NOWAK, supra note 88, at 264.  For a detailed analysis of the SSPD see John Nash, Non-
cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951). 
151. In duopoly markets, the three types of competitive relationship that prevail are as follows:
“independent,” in which both firms make decisions regarding prices independently and simultaneously 
and competition prevails; “leader-follower,” in which one firm sets price followed by its rival and the 
market and profits are split based on this arrangement; and “collusive,” where the rivals collectively 
decide prices to maximize joint profits. See Day et al., supra note 7, at 222–24 (describing various 
duopoly pricing mechanisms).  In SSPD: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe, it is assumed that firms price 
simultaneously, which is a simplification of reality made in sacrifice to the demands of theory 
development.  For a discussion of the complexity introduced with the modeling of sequential games, 
particularly in terms of the importance of private information see EILON SOLAN & LEEAT YARIV, 
GAMES WITH ESPIONAGE, 2–27 (2002). 
152. These assumptions are standard SSPD simplifying assumptions used to model duopoly
interactions.  See Kattan & Vigdor, supra note 14, at 447. Here, the payoffs in SSPD: Dewey Cheatham 
v. EnHowe are not denominated in dollars because the value of each strategy is determined not only by
the price chosen by each rival but by the number of gallons of gasoline sold (which is somewhat
sensitive to demand) and the profit margin per gallon (which is a nonlinear calculation due to the large
percentage of costs that are fixed in the petroleum industry).  It is assumed that the microeconomic
effects on supply and demand of the firms’ pricing strategies need not be modeled in greater detail to
capture the strategic interaction in terms of payoffs and preferences for rival firms.
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Here, C is the payoff where both firms cooperate and charge the High 
Price of $3.99, D is the payoff when both firms defect from cooperation 
and charge the Low Price of $1.70, D – E is the high payoff that goes to the 
defector when the other firm cooperates, L is the low payoff that goes to 
the loser (the cooperator) when the other player defects, and D – E > ½C > 
½D > E.153 
d. Analysis: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Competition
An examination of the payoffs reveals to both firms that, although the
desired outcome for each firm was to charge Low Price while its rival 
charged High Price, thus earning H for itself, the strongly dominant 
strategy for each was to charge Low Price and avoid the possibility of 
being stuck with L when it charged High Price and its rival charged Low 
Price.  Although the firms could benefit individually and collectively by 
each charging High Price and thereby improving the payoffs associated 
with their dominant strategies, they were unable to generate sufficient trust 
to achieve this superior equilibrium during “Competition,” and thus a 
Pareto-inferior but stable  Nash equilibrium of Low Price, Low Price 
solved this game.  In other words, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe would 
have preferred the High Price, High Price solution to the SSPD,154 but a 
competitive market where the Low Price of $1.70 prevailed due to the 
interaction of the individual self-interests of the firms, their failure to 
communicate, their inability to generate trust that initial cooperative pricing 
decision would be reciprocated, and their inability to sanction defection 
from their mutually preferred equilibrium. 
2. Cooperation: The Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Tit-for-
Tat
During the “Cooperation” phase, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe, 
despite continuing their intense and expensive competition in fuel 
153. The four payoffs in the PD matrix are conventional but arbitrary, and are labeled with letters, C
(Cooperate), D (Defect), E (Lose), and D – E (Cheat). Formally, a set of inequalities defines the PD: a 
game is a PD if D - E > C/2 > D/2 > E.  See, e.g., Boyd & Richerson, The Evolution of Reciprocity in 
Sizable Groups, 132 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 337 (1988). 
154. The assumption as to firms’ rationality has already been specified.  See OSBORNE & 
RUBINSTEIN, supra, note 139, at 4.  Duopolists dislike low prices for a bevy of reasons, including lost 
potential profits, and prefer high prices to low prices out of rational self-interest.  Rudolf R.J. Peritz, 
Toward a Dynamic Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Market Behavior, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 114 
(listing reasons duopolists prefer high prices); BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, supra note 8, at 4 
(explaining that low prices “lead to surrendered profits all around”). 
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additives, developed a long-term cooperative relationship and a high-price 
equilibrium without expressly communicating their interests in doing so. 
Frequent reciprocal collection of information about rival pricing intentions 
and decisions acquired using lawful CI was interpreted not as hostile 
activity but as a useful mechanism to verify an ongoing commitment to 
ensure that what few defections occurred were swiftly detected and 
punished and that cooperation was restored.  Both firms, in effect, 
understood that verification was desirable and that CI served this end, and 
as a result each earned an equal share of supracompetitive profits without 
incurring antitrust liability.  The Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 
(“IRPD“) explains the strategic interaction during “Cooperation.” 
a. Game Description: IRPD with Tit-for-Tat
The competitive equilibrium in the SSPD is Pareto-inferior as it does
not maximize players’ welfare.  However, repetition of the SSPD game can 
induce more cooperative behavior and more efficient solutions, particularly 
if the game is of uncertain duration or is infinitely repeated.155  Unlike the 
SSPD, the IRPD allows the shadow of the future to loom over current 
actions: when players know they will interact beyond the instant period, 
they must consider not only the present costs and benefits of their strategies 
but also the costs and benefits incurred in future periods as a result of 
present actions.  In the IRPD each player’s best action and strategy still 
depends upon the other player as it does in SSPD,156 but now there is the 
real possibility of cooperation under three separate circumstances: (1) if the 
players can directly communicate the desired action and strategy to each 
other in advance of the game and trust each other to choose that action and 
play that strategy in the absence of any enforcement mechanism, (2) if an 
external entity can enforce a penalty against defection sufficient to induce 
the noncompetitive, Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium, or (3) if the players 
can derive a self-enforcing mechanism that promotes this cooperative 
solution and allows for the evolution of trust backed by the threat of 
sanctions over time.157 
155. The longer the PD is repeated, the greater the chance of cooperation.  R.L. Trivers, The 
Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 QUANT. REV. BIO. 35 (1971). 
156. The IRPD game shares the set of assumptions from the SSPD game and incorporates the
additional assumption for purposes of simplicity that players determine their strategies before the game 
begins, although in the real world trial and error is used to search for strategies.  Matsui, supra note 46, 
at 110. 
157.  According to an early game theorist,
If we assume that the two players of PD can make a pact to effect the mutually advantageous outcome 
the prospective partners must have a common language.  They must also either profess allegiance to or 
tender obedience to a common authority, either coercive, like a police force, or internalized like 
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Direct communication is not always possible, and external entities are 
not always available or favorably disposed to promoting the goals of the 
players; in the case of antitrust law, direct communication between firms as 
to pricing decisions is legally proscribed by the most relevant external 
entity—the state—which categorically opposes the cooperative solution on 
behalf of consumers.  However, self-enforcement can be created and 
sustained as an effective mechanism for promoting the cooperative solution 
if each player can monitor and punish the other upon observed defection in 
previous periods of the game.158  Over time, as players gain experience 
converging their interests in cooperation in their interactions with one 
another and develop reputations for fairness and reliability,159 trust can 
emerge160 provided players’ actions are sufficiently transparent to 
communicate the interest in and commitment to cooperation and the 
punishment for defection is swift, sure, cheap, and significant enough to 
render cooperation more valuable than defection and therefore rational.161  
When the credible threat of punishment renders cooperation rational, a 
“subgame perfect” Nash equilibrium can be achieved which dominates the  
conscience.  Pacts must be enforceable. ANATOL RAPOPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE (1962).  For 
a description of the sufficient conditions precedent for cooperation in the IRPD see J.P. Mayberry, John 
F. Nash, & Martin Shubik, A Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation, 21 ECONOMETRICA
141, 144–46 (1953); Matsui, supra note 46, at 94, 99.
158.  Matsui, supra note 46, at 94 (stating that the capacity to punish defection is a necessary
condition for cooperation in the repeated PD game).  For this reason, games in which punishment for 
defection is enforceable and cooperation is therefore possible are called “cooperative,” while those in 
which enforcement is not possible—including the SSPD—are called “noncooperative.”  DIXIT & 
SKEATH, supra note 6, at 26. 
159. See id. at 21–24 (describing the process whereby players in the IRPD develop reputations
based on their play in previous periods, and linking reputation to the evolution of trust regarding future 
periods). 
160. See generally AXELROD, supra note 37. 
161. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 19, at 610 (enumerating the requirements
for punishment sufficient to prevent defection and produce cooperation in the IRPD); An absence of 
transparency is a major impediment to cooperation inasmuch as it prevents the observation of the 
current actions of rivals which is necessary to reinforce the emergence of trust in the commitment that 
past cooperative actions will be reciprocated and matched by future cooperative actions.  BAIRD ET AL., 
supra note 21, at 174; Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 19, at 573 (explaining why the 
inability to observe rivals’ actions undermines trust).  Moreover, when defection cannot be readily or 
accurately detected, rivals cannot ensure that punishment minimizes the benefit of defection and 
increases the costs to outweigh the gains sufficiently to render defection irrational.  DIXIT & SKEATH, 
supra note 6, at 355.  In other words, only if the prospects for gain through defection are openly, 
objectively, and sufficiently bleak does defection become irrational and cooperation become rational in 
the IRPD.  One of the most significant obstacles to cooperation is the inability to observe directly the 
pricing decisions of rivals.  A firm may not learn that a rival has defected and cut price until demand for 
its goods declines or until customers report the information, and under such circumstances the ability to 
punish defection is diminished, along with the ability to sustain cooperation.  Yao, supra note 13, at 
316. 
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Pareto-inferior competitive outcome and thus forms the cooperative 
solution to the IRPD.162 
Various continent, or “trigger,” strategies been devised to punish 
rivals effectively for defection in the previous period of the IRPD and 
thereby create the enforcement-backed trust necessary to induce the 
cooperative solution.  One of the “nicer” trigger strategies is Tit-for-Tat 
(“TFT”), which cooperates until the rival defects, punishes the defector in 
the next period of play, and then resumes cooperating one period after the 
rival does so.163  The IRPD-TFT differs from the SSPD in that the former 
requires incorporation of time-value of money considerations because the 
gains of defection are had in the present period while the costs are incurred 
in future periods.164  Provided that the present value of the gains of 
defection are smaller than the present value of future costs, it is rational to 
cooperate; this quantitative determination depends in turn upon the interest 
rate, r, at which future costs are discounted.165  Assuming low interest rates 
and the reciprocal capacity to punish defection with sufficient severity to 
162. “Subgame perfection” implies that players will carry out all threats because the cooperative
outcome protected through punishment is more valuable even after paying the costs of punishment, and 
therefore no player has an incentive to deviate from an equilibrium strategy regardless of actions in 
previous periods.  Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the 
Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1286–87 (2003). 
163. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 352 (describing TFT as one of the “nicer” trigger
strategies due to its swift return to cooperation post-punishment).  Moreover TFT is considered a “nice” 
strategy because it commences by cooperating in the first period of a PD game, and thus cannot, by 
definition, prevail in a single period.  Mayberry et al., supra note 157, at 146–48. 
164. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 352 (describing TFT as one of the “nicer” trigger
strategies due to its swift return to cooperation post-punishment).  The probability that a PD game will 
continue beyond the present—0 is less than or equal to P is less than or equal to 1—is also an important 
consideration in the decision to defect.  For purposes of simplicity the assumption is made that the 
IRPD is truly an infinitely repeated game and not simply a PD of indefinite duration, and thus the 
probability the IRPD will continue into the next period is 1. 
165.  A quantitative analysis of the IRPD played with the TFT strategy reveals that it is rational to
defect once against the TFT-playing rival if the one-time gain from defecting, (H – C), is greater than 
the present value of the single-period loss from being punished prior to returning to cooperation, (C – 
L).  Incorporating r as the periodic interest rate, it is thus rational to defect for one period against at 
TFT-playing rival if (H – C) > (C – L)/(1 + r), or (1 + r) (H – C) > (C – L), or r > [(C – L)/(H – C)] – 1.  
Similarly, it is rational to defect forever against a TFT-playing rival only if the one-time gain from 
defecting, (H – C), exceeds the present value of the infinite sum of the per-period losses from perpetual 
defecting, (C – D), and thus perpetual defection occurs only if (H – C) > (C – D)/r, or r > (C – D)/(H – 
C).  Several additional conclusions follow from a quantitative analysis of the IPRD-TFT: (1) if the 
values of the gains and losses from defecting are fixed, changes in r determine whether a player defects, 
with defection more likely the higher the value of r; (2) if r is fixed, changes in per period losses 
associated with punishment determine whether a player defects, with the severity of the punishment 
inversely correlated with defection probability; (3) if r and per period losses are fixed, defection is more 
likely the higher the gain from defection; (4) the faster and more accurately defection can be detected, 
the sooner and more surely punishment can be inflicted and the less likely defection will be.  For a 
general discussion of the mathematics of the IPRD-TFT game, see, e.g., Daniel Ashlock, Christopher 
Kuuselo, & Monica Cojocara, Shopkeeper Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (manuscript in 
possession of the author). 
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render the payoff for the cooperative outcome—½ C—greater than the 
payoff for defection (D – E) minus the cost of punishment—(½ C – E), 
IRPD-TFT predicts that the likelihood of defection will be very low and 
that once established cooperation will be evolutionarily stable.166  
Accordingly, IRPD-TFT predicts further that rational firms will 
independently recognize their interdependence, intuit the benefits of 
cooperation, and communicate their interests in and commitment to 
achieving the cooperative solution to the IRPD by making cooperative 
pricing decisions in the initial period and employing the TFT strategy in 
subsequent periods to continue cooperation without the need for express 
agreements or the exchange of additional information, save for the 
monitoring necessary to maintain trust and to prevent and punish 
defections.167 
b. Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Cooperation
In the IRPD, C is the cooperative payoff split between players, D is
the competitive payoff split between players when both defect, D – E (or 
H) is the “High” payoff to the defector when the other player cooperates, E
(or L) is the “Low” payoff to the cooperator when the other player defects,
and D – E > ½C > ½D > E:168
166.  Defection from Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria tends to occur only when prevailing interest
rates reach historically high levels. Assume that (a) collusive profit, C, is $500 million per month, b) 
high profit, D – E, is $800 million per month, and (c) low profit, E, is $150 million per month.  A firm 
employing TFT can thus effectively prevent defections by its rival only where r > [(C – E) /(D – E – C)] 
– 1, or where the interest rate is just under 17% per month.  U.S. interest rates have not exceeded
2%/month since the Civil War. See Jeffrey Williamson, American Growth and the Balance of
Payments, 1820–1913, 20 J. FIN. 164, 164–66 (1966).  Other conditions which can trigger defection
include when an entire industry verges on collapse, and thus the shadow of the future slips away, or
when a firm plans a quick exit from the market.  DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 356.
167. This Article considers that, as part of the rationality assumption, players in the IRPD-TFT
game recognize and avoid the danger that the TFT strategy can pose to the stability of cooperation if 
after the first defection and punishment the punished player does not accept the “Low Price” 
punishment and instead defects again, thereby sending the game into a perpetual series of punishments 
and a competitive equilibrium from which the players cannot escape.  DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 
356 (discussing the “echo” problem in TFT).  For an examination of the strength of this assumption 
based on empirical research in the natural world, see generally Robert Boyd & Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum, 
No Pure Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, 327 NATURE 58 
(1987). 
168.  The payoffs associated with this version of the PD game have the following properties: (1) C > 
D, (2) E is a small but nonzero number because some consumers are not price sensitive or cannot 
immediately adapt to purchase at the lowest price, and (3) D – E > ½ C > ½D, where c = cartel profits 
and d = competitive profits. 
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Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Tit-for-Tat: 
DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Cooperation 
EnHowe 




Price ½ D, ½ D D – E, E 
High 
Price E, D – E ½ C, ½ C 
c. Analysis: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Cooperation
Analysis of the strategic interaction between DeweyCheatham and 
EnHowe During Phase Two: Cooperation reinforces these predictions.  By 
intuiting that cooperation was possible given the existence of mutual 
interests, the shadow of the future, and the capacity of both firms to punish 
defections, and by communicating information through pricing decisions 
regarding their intent to achieve “High Price” cooperation, 
DeweyCheatham and EnHowe developed trust that enabled them to solve 
the game with the cooperative, subgame perfect, and Pareto-superior Nash 
equilibrium, earning each firm supracompetitive profits.  Moreover, the 
rivals did so without entering into any express agreement proscribed by 
antitrust law.  In those few instances where one rival defected, the other 
applied effective “Low Price” punishment in the next period, and the 
defecting rival recognized the punishment for what it was and returned to 
cooperation, as prescribed by TFT, in subsequent periods.  As a result, 
DeweyCheatham and EnHowe earned supracompetitive profits and pushed 
the price of gasoline to a peak of $5.10 with legal impunity. 
3. Defection: Infinitely-Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Grim Trigger
Espionage introduces additional complexity into the IRPD.  A firm
that commits EE appears to choose the cooperative “High Price, High 
Price” equilibrium but is secretly defecting because a firm that can produce 
goods or services without having to pay the necessary research and 
development and technological costs creates a lower cost structure and thus 
earn a significantly greater profit even when pricing its goods and services 
in parity with a rival.169  Firms that acquire information such as trade 
169. A firm that steals information from its rival can cut its own research and development, reduce
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secrets at no cost can effectively defect from the high-price equilibrium and 
charge competitive prices without losing all the gains from pricing high.170  
By contrast, firms that lose their investment in R&D must nevertheless 
match their rivals’ low prices at greatly reduced profit margins.  Thus, a 
firm that engages in EE is effectively charging “Low Price,” while 
deceptively inducing its rival to continue selecting “High Price” in the 
belief that the cooperative equilibrium prevails.171  EE thus is an 
abandonment of cooperation and a shift of payoffs to both firms away from 
the cooperative equilibrium of (½ C, ½ C), to (D – E, E), for as long as 
possible.  In so doing, the spying firm informs its rival of its willingness to 
risk the chance that the short-term gains of espionage—however long they 
endure—will exceed the long-term gains of cooperation, and that it cannot 
be trusted to confine itself within the boundaries of legitimate information-
gathering. 
a. Game Description: IRPD with Grim Trigger
Not surprisingly, not all trigger strategies are as nice as TFT; when
one player is caught spying, it is often punished for its defection with the 
“grim trigger” (“GRIT”) strategy.  A player playing GRIT commences by 
cooperating but then responds to a single defection in any period with 
defection forevermore, and thus following the defection of either player the 
solution for the remainder of the game is the competitive Nash equilibrium. 
b. Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Defection
For every period prior to and include the period in which espionage is
detected, the firm engaged in EE earns the “High Price, Low Price” payoff 
of (D – E) while the cheated rival earns (E); for each subsequent period, 
both firms earn the competitive payoff of ½ D: 
its long-term cost structure, and either cut prices beneath its rival’s marginal cost or produce higher 
quality goods at the competitive price, thereby enabling it to claim additional market share and profits. 
170.  This assumes, of course, that the cost of CE operations is less than the value of the information
acquired, or else firms would not resort to CE.  SOLAN & YAARIV, supra note 151, at 4–5. 
171. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 4–6 (describing the effects of espionage on the IRPD). 
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Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Grim Trigger: 
DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe Subsequent to Defection 
EnHowe 




Price ½ D, ½ D N/A 
High 
Price N/A N/A 
c. Shift to Penance
Escape from the competitive equilibrium and a return to cooperation 
following the resort to GRIT requires that the firm that employed EE shift 
to the “Penance” strategy, which calls for the spying firm to return to 
cooperation under the TFT strategy in the period subsequent to absorbing 
punishment in the hope that the targeted firm will conclude that it is 
possible to trust the spying firm again and thus to reciprocate by also 
cooperating under the TFT strategy.172  Firms shifting to Penance following 
punishment under GRIT recognize the need to inform rivals that they are 
once again trustworthy and therefore predicate their entreaties to restore 
cooperation upon allegations that the EE was an unauthorized mistake or 
upon promises to enter private negotiations to resolve the theft. 
d. Analysis: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe Under Defection
Examination of the strategic interaction between DeweyCheatham and 
EnHowe during Phase Three: Defection suggests that, upon discovering 
EnHowe’s EE attack, DeweyCheatham recognized that it had been 
deceived into believing a cooperative equilibrium had existed for a number 
of periods during which it had in fact earned E rather than the anticipated ½ 
C, while EnHowe had earned (D – E).  Furthermore, DeweyCheatham 
conceded, upon subsequent investigation, that EnHowe did not share its 
understanding of the legitimate boundaries of information exchange, or was 
unwilling to abide by a tacit understanding as to these boundaries, in the 
monitoring of pricing decisions.  Clearly, EnHowe’s suggestion that the EE 
attack as the action of rogue operators acting outside the scope of delegated 
authority was nothing more than an effort to avoid penalties associated with 
defection and maximize its welfare.  Nonetheless, DeweyCheatham, prior 
172. See Edelman, supra note 143, at 457–58 (discussing the “Penance” strategy). 
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to shifting from cooperation under TFT to GRIT, offered EnHowe the 
chance to shift from defection under TFT to Penance predicated upon the 
compensation to DeweyCheatham for the loss of value represented by the 
difference between ½ C and E as well as by demonstrating its renewed 
trustworthiness and its understanding of the acceptable limits of 
information exchange. When EnHowe refused to accept DeweyCheatham’s 
ultimatum, despite implying that its EE attack on DeweyCheatham had 
been a mistake and that it recognized the inefficiency of the competitive 
equilibrium that loomed, this decision was received by DeweyCheatham as 
EnHowe’s continued commitment to EE and defection under TFT.173 
Accordingly, DeweyCheatham switched strategies from TFT to GRIT 
and initiated punishment by reducing the price of gasoline and refusing to 
respond to subsequent signals, in the form of EnHowe’s hesitancy to match 
DeweyCheatham’s price cuts, that EnHowe had repented and was now 
interested in restoring cooperation.  In effect, DeweyCheatham 
communicated to EnHowe that the latter was insufficiently trustworthy to 
justify the risk of cooperation.  Eventually, as GRIT unfolded, the price of 
gasoline retreated toward the competitive price, and the firms lost producer 
surplus. 
4. Sanction: Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Third-Party
Penalties
a. Game Description: IRPD with Third-Party Penalties
When sanctions for defection are insufficient to restore a cooperative
equilibrium and/or compensate for losses suffered during periods prior to 
the discovery of espionage, a player in the IRPD may look to third parties 
such as the state to impose additional penalties upon its defecting rival. 
Third-party penalties—which can include deprivations of liberty or 
property if administered by legal authority, or worse if implemented 
173.  Clearly, DeweyCheatham cannot have expected EnHowe to accept its ultimatum
unconditionally, nor could DeweyCheatham have anticipated that full implementation of its ultimatum 
would fully eradicate all knowledge of its trade secrets from EnHowe’s collective corporate mind, nor 
could DeweyCheatham have believed that any short-term anticompetitive commitment conferred by 
EnHowe would make DeweyCheatham whole, let alone grant any sustainable competitive advantage.  
However, assuming that both firms are rational, negotiation theory would have predicted that a 
negotiated settlement near the midpoint of the range of possibilities between the ultimatum as presented 
and no agreement whatsoever should have been concluded that would have substantially disclosed the 
facts, compensated DeweyCheatham to some significant degree, offered commitments to behave 
differently in the future, and largely restored the relationship ex ante the EE attack.  See generally GUY 
BURGESS & HEIDI BURGESS, EDS., NEGOTIATION THEORY: BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (2004).  That this 
did not occur made DeweyCheatham’s shift in strategy toward third-party party penalties 
understandable, if, in light of the insufficiency of the EEA, suboptimal.  See infra at Part III.C. 
 Summer 2012 PRICE CARTELS 339 
extralegally—can restore injured parties in whole or in part to their 
positions ex ante the defection, render future defection so unattractive that 
the cooperative outcome is more stable, or both.174  In the IRPD with Third-
Party Penalty (“IRPD-3PP”) game, a third-party imposes a penalty “X” 
such that X > E, and thus the payoff to the defector from cooperation 
becomes negative after subtracting the value of the penalty, X.  If properly 
calibrated, X renders defection so unattractive as to suppress it entirely and, 
in effect, leaves but one strategy for both players—cooperate and choose 
“High Price.”175 
b. Anticipated Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During IRPD-3PP
In referring the theft of its Project K2 trade secrets to the FBI for
prosecution under the EEA, DeweyCheatham intended to have the state 
impose a penalty, X, equal to either $5 billion or at least sufficiently high 
that this punishment, in conjunction with any reputational sanctions against 
EnHowe imposed by the markets, would compensate DeweyCheatham for 
the loss suffered in previous periods—(½C – E) in each period—while 
recouping to DeweyCheatham the value of the expropriated trade secrets, 
convincing EnHowe that future EE would be counterproductive, and 
restoring the cooperative “High Price” equilibrium.176  In turning to the 
state for penalties against EnHowe, DeweyCheatham anticipated that a 
judicial order protecting Project K2 trade secrets during discovery and trial 
would prevent further injury.  To further indemnify itself against EnHowe’s 
theft of its trade secrets in Project K2, DeweyCheatham intoduced an 
earlier generation additive into its gasoline while reducing its prices in an 
attempt to capture market share away from EnHowe and earn X in the 
period of sanctions as well as D – E in subsequent periods for as long as 
possible before EnHowe could respond with its own gasoline additive and 
either signal its intention to restore cooperation or to revert to a competitive 
market.  The payoff matrix DeweyCheatham anticipated during the 
period(s) of sanction under the EEA was as follows, where D – E + X > ½ 
C + X > ½ D + X > E + X > D – E – X > ½C – X > ½D – X > E – X: 
174. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 357–58 (illustrating the effects of third-party penalties
on the IRPD). 
175.  See id. at 356–57 (suggesting that in fact this is an assurance game with two sustainable
equilibria). 
176. The possibility of third-party penalties, in addition to the cost of collection, means that the
intelligence enterprise, to include EE, “can very well be of no use whatsoever, even 
counterproductive[.]”  Richard Horowitz, A Framework for Understanding Intelligence, 8 INT’L J. 
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 389, 389 (1995). 
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Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Third-Party Penalty 
(Anticipated): DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe Under Sanction 
EnHowe 




Price ½D + X, ½D – X D – E + X, E – X 
High 
Price E + X, D – E – X ½C + X, ½C – X 
c. Analysis: Expected Payoffs
However, in publicizing the theft of its trade secrets and electing to
prosecute EnHowe under the EEA, DeweyCheatham miscalculated the 
reach and scope of third-party penalties, and thus these anticipated payoffs 
did not materialize.  The market did indeed impose penalties; however, 
DeweyCheatham, rather than EnHowe, was the primary subject. 
Moreover, the judicial penalties imposed on EnHowe under the EEA were 
markedly less severe than DeweyCheatham anticipated, inadequate to 
render EnHowe’s payoff negative, and inadequate in making 
DeweyCheatham whole. 
As DeweyCheatham anticipated, historical analysis of EEA 
prosecutions does in fact reveal that third-party penalties include market-
imposed penalties in addition to those imposed by the state, and that the 
former are even more significant than the latter in terms of their strategic 
effects upon the IPRD played by the firms involved in EEA cases. 
However, DeweyCheatham did not discern that these penalties work 
predominantly against the firm losing trade secrets rather than against the 
spying firm.  Not only does the market not regard EE as deserving of moral 
opprobrium,  but it actually imposes indirect sanctions on firms admitting 
the theft of trade secrets, and these indirect sanctions are often more costly 
than the value of the purloined secrets themselves.177  Reasons for this are 
two: (1) the defendant firm will likely be granted some access to the trade 
secrets at issue in order to aid the defense even if a judicial order provides 
some protection, thus in effect completing the attempted crime and 
enriching the spying firm in the amount of the value of the information 
minus any fines,178 and (2) when information that a firm has been 
177.  Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 52. 
178.  See United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev’d 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.
1998) (leaving open the opportunity for defendants charged with substantive crimes under the EEA to 
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victimized by EE is publicly revealed, the stock price of that firm declines 
to reflect the potential for additional loss in trade secret value to be wrought 
through litigation as well as the diminished confidence of investors and 
analysts in its ability to protect its intellectual property and, by inference, in 
its managerial competence.179  Empirical research indicates that public 
disclosures of trade secret theft are associated with a statistically significant 
and negative stock market response: when the market discovers that a firm 
has been subjected to EE the market capitalization of the targeted firm 
decreases, as the consequence of this discovery, by 8.92% on average.180  
Indeed, rational firms might well consider, when victimized by EE, that 
they are better off if they treat the fact of their loss as a sunk cost rather 
than prosecute lest they cause additional trade secret leakage through trial 
and additional stock price devaluation upon publicization.181 
Moreover, the severity of state-imposed penalties for violation of the 
EEA has proven insufficient to deter against defections, as well as to 
recoup the loss to firms victimized by EE.  In the fifteen years of EEA 
prosecutions, court-ordered fines, restitution, and forfeitures taken together 
have ranged from as little as $200 to no more than $12 million with the 
median fine a mere $50,000.182  By contrast, the value of trade secrets at 
issue in an EEA case is frequently much greater than the financial penalties 
judicially imposed for their unlawful expropriation, and the statute itself 
caps the maximum fine at $5 million.183  Although the precise calculation 
demand discovery of the victim firm’s trade secrets).  This unsavory prospect was anticipated in 
congressional hearings prior to the enactment of EEA.  See S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 11 (1996) (“Even if 
a company does bring [charges], the . . . penalties are often absorbed by the offender as a cost of doing 
business and the stolen information retained for continued use.”). 
179.  See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 52–53.   See also Weld Royal, Too Much Trust?, 
INDUSTRY WK., Nov. 2, 1998, available at http://www.industryweek.com/articles/too_much_trust_ 
129.aspx (“Information loss is like the AIDS of corporate America . . . For a long time no one would
talk about it, fearing the impact on their stock prices and confidence of customers.”).
180.  See Carr & Gorman, supra note 56, at 44–50 (developing a model based on eleven cases of
CE where the monetary value of trade secrets stolen is conservatively estimated and data are controlled 
for other variables and finding a correlation between victimization by CE and loss of market 
capitalization).  Others dispute the quantifiability of the costs of CE.  See, e.g, KAHANER, supra note 
71, at 230 (“Trying to quantify the direct effect of competitive intelligence is like a city trying to 
quantify the return it receives on having excellent schools, fire department, police, and trash pickup.”). 
181.  Perhaps the sole reason why a rational firm might seek criminal charges against another firm
for theft of trade secrets is to inflict reputational harm in the hope that the damage will be so great as to 
eliminate that rival from the market altogether.  See Slind-Flor, supra note 57, at 1 (offering this 
explanation for the EEA). 
182. See Rustad, supra note 59, at 500–01 (analyzing EEA cases and developing quantitative
measurements of prison sentences, fines, and forfeitures).  See generally Ghosh, supra note 61. 
183. Fines are paid to the government under the EEA, whereas restitution is undertaken by the
government under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act with proceeds paid to the victim firm.  See 
EEA, supra at note 53, at 18 U.S.C. § 1834; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (providing for restitution of the proceeds of crimes to victims of, inter alia, the 
Economic Espionage Act). 
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of the value of expropriated trade secrets is a complex and contested 
venture,184 research and development costs can reach almost twenty percent 
of total revenue, particularly in high-technology industries.185  Adopting a 
simplifying assumption that the value of trade secrets represents, on 
average, ten percent of the revenue of any given firm, a $5 million civil 
forfeiture penalty levied by a court for the theft of those trade secrets is 
sufficient to make a victimized firm whole only if that firm’s revenues for 
the period are not greater than $50 million. 
In fact, the scope and extent of third-party penalties triggered by EEA 
prosecution were such that, had DeweyCheatham had an accurate 
appreciation of them, it would likely have chosen a different strategy than 
IRPD-3PP.  Specifically, if DeweyCheatham’s market capitalization pre-
disclosure was $1 trillion,186 then the potential self-imposed penalty to 
DeweyCheatham for disclosing the theft could well approach $89 billion.187 
Moreover, given annual revenues for each firm of approximately $900 
billion and net annual profits of approximately $62 billion, or $5.2 
billion/month,188 at the prevailing low real interest rate r of less than three 
percent it would be virtually impossible for DeweyCheatham to recover the 
loss occasioned by disclosure of the theft through punishment of EnHowe, 
as the latter would have to cease operations and sales of all gasoline, fuel 
additives, and all other goods and services for eighteen months and 
voluntarily grant DeweyCheatham a monopoly in order to make 
184. The reasons for the difficulties courts face in determining the value of stolen trade secrets are
many, complex, and beyond the scope of this Article.  For a discussion of the various methods courts 
use to determine loss under the EEA, including fair market value, reasonable royalty, lost profits, and 
research and development costs, as well as a discussion of the doctrinal and practical complexities 
involved in making injured firms whole, see generally Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 67, at 323.  
For a discussion of how quantitative financial methods might be used to derive the value of intellectual 
property, see generally F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, 
and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175 (2002–2003). 
185. See Research & Development Expenses as a Percentage of Total Revenue, WIKINVEST (Jan.
22, 2012, 8:00PM), http://www.wikinvest.com/metric/Research_%26_Development_Expenses_as_a_ 
Percentage_of_Total_Revenue. 
186. The market capitalization of all the private-sector petroleum firms that currently supply refined
gasoline to the U.S. market is approximately $2 trillion.  See 2010 Financial Statements, supra note 
117. This Article assumes that each of the fictional firms, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe, is $1 trillion.
See PETROSTRATEGIS, INC., http://www.petrostrategies.org. 
187. With a market capitalization of $1 trillion, the average market penalty of 8.92% for disclosing
the theft of trade secrets is $89.2 billion.  See 2010 Financial Statements, supra note 117. 
188.  The reported financial data for ExxonMobil—the largest private-sector petroleum firm
supplying the U.S. market with a seventeen percent market share—is extrapolated and used as the basis 
for determining the market capitalization, revenue, and profits of the fictional firms DeweyCheatham 
and EnHowe, duopolists that each have a fifty percent share of the U.S. market in the hypothetical 
scenario.  See Financial Statements & Supplemental Information: For the Fiscal Year Ended December 
31, 2010, EXXONMOBIL (2010), http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/news_pub_ir_financial 
_2010.pdf (reporting 2010 FY total market capitalization of $314.5 billion, revenue of $284.7 billion, 
and profit of $19.3 billion). 
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DeweyCheatham “whole.”  The state-imposed penalty of $10 million 
against EnHowe—$5 million paid in forfeiture to DeweyCheatham and 
another $5 million fine to the federal treasury—was trivial at best. Thus, by 
seeking a direct penalty upon EnHowe through EEA prosecution, 
DeweyCheatham incurred indirect market-based penalties as great as 
eighteen months of supracompetitive profits in exchange for a meager 
compensatory payment from EnHowe.189 
d. Actual Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Sanction
In the IRPD-3PP with the actual payoffs, both firms incurred penalties
as the result of public disclosure of a violation of the EEA—the disclosing 
victim, DeweyCheatham, through the market in the amount of $89 billion 
or 9C (calculated as 18 x monthly cartel profits of ½C); the targeting firm, 
EnHowe, through the court in the amount of $10 million or about 001C 
(calculated as 0.1% of monthly cartel profits of ½C).  The following matrix 
illustrates the actual payoffs, where D = 7 billion, C = 10.4 billion, E = 1 
billion, and  D – E – .001C > ½ C – .001C >  ½ D – .001C >  E – .001C > 
D – E – 8.9995C >  ½ C – 8.995C >  ½ D – 8.995C >  E – 8.9995C: 
Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Third-Party Penalty: 
DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Sanction (Actual) 
EnHowe 





½ D – 8.9995C, ½ 
D -.001C 




E – 8.9995C, D – E 
- .001C
½ C – 8.9995C, ½ C 
- .001C
e. Analysis: Actual Payoffs
An examination of the payoff matrix that actually attended the IRPD-
3PP game explains why DeweyCheatham’s decision to prosecute EnHowe, 
which failed to appreciate the effects of disclosure of the theft of Project 
K2 trade secrets upon its firm value and overestimated the sufficiency of 
state-imposed financial penalties upon EnHowe, was roundly, and fairly, 
189.  The simplifying assumption is made that the disclosing firm absorbs the entire indirect market
penalty for disclosure in the first period following disclosure. 
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criticized.  The resort to third-party penalties not only diminished the value 
of DeweyCheatham absolutely as well as relative to EnHowe, but it left 
DeweyCheatham with exclusively negative payoffs and EnHowe with 
exclusively positive payoffs.  Moreover, the decision to prosecute under the 
EEA, rather than negotiate privately, triggered not only negative payoffs 
for DeweyCheatham during the period(s) of sanctions, but it also led both 
firms into a price war which further sacrificed producer surplus as the price 
of more efficient and therefore more valuable formulations of gasoline than 
had been available prior to the EE attack, for which both firms could have 
charged a higher price even under a competitive market structure, tumbled 
to $1.70.  Had DeweyCheatham taken EnHowe’s request to negotiate more 
seriously, a better outcome was clearly possible. 
Moreover, while EnHowe gained relative to DeweyCheatham during 
Defection, nothing prevented DeweyCheatham from turning the tables on 
EnHowe in future periods and executing an EE attack against the latter now 
that trust was utterly destroyed as between the two firms.  As the payoff 
matrix supra reveals, EE is costly for the victim, particularly if it seeks a 
legal remedy, and costly for the perpetrator, which must incur the costs of 
EE as well as whatever penalties are judicially imposed.  Although the 
gathering and analysis of information to monitor and verify compliance 
with tacit agreements to price supracompetitively supports high profits, it 
nonetheless constitutes a cost of doing business.  Moreover, the possibility 
that a rival is engaged in EE rather than permissible monitoring of pricing 
decisions that support a cooperative equilibrium imposes uncertainty and 
increases the prospect of misperceptions of defection, leading to spirals of 
punishment and retaliation that intensify competition and erode profits.190  
As the supracompetitive pricing and profits during Phase Three: 
Cooperation made manifest, a better strategy was available to both firms 
provided they could reduce the moral hazard inherent in the monitoring 
enterprise that had created incentives to EE, and this in turn required that 
the firms reach agreement as to the permissible means and limits of 
information exchange and create an information exchange regime that 
promoted, rather than eroded, trust. 
190.  See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 356 (discussing the danger of “echoing” during the
IPRD-TFT game). 
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5. Collusion: The Assurance Game
a. Game Description: Assurance Game
One strategy to increase individual and joint welfare beyond the limits
of what is available within the PD game is to transcend the PD entirely.  In 
the SSPD, each player always does better by defecting regardless of what 
the other player does, and does best by defecting when the other 
cooperates, although each would prefer that both could trust the other to 
cooperate so that each could achieve the mutually preferred but more risky 
cooperative equilibrium.  In the IRPD, players are able, by credibly 
threatening punishment for defection, to more closely align their interests 
and make the cooperative equilibrium more likely and more stable if still 
uncertain.  In the “Assurance Game” (“AG”), however, payoffs are 
structured such that each player prefers mutual cooperation over mutual 
competition but also prefers mutual competition to unilateral cooperation, 
because unilateral cooperation yields the worst possible payoff to the 
cooperator as well as a payoff inferior to both mutual cooperation and 
mutual competition to the defector.191  AG players maximize their welfare 
by acting in concert, and the AG models their strategic interactions where 
mutual cooperation is the best possible, but still risky, outcome. 
The classic example of the AG is the “Stag Hunt.”  In the Stag Hunt, 
two hunters forge a temporary alliance to hunt, and both have a preference 
for stag (deer) over hare (rabbit).  To kill a stag successfully, the hunters 
must cooperate—neither is strong enough independently, and each must 
remain at his observation post to be prepared to respond to the discovery of 
a stag and then join together with the other hunter in the kill.  However, if a 
hare ventures within reach of either, he will abandon the stag hunt—in 
other words, defect from the cooperative outcome—and pursue, kill, and 
consume most of this hare, leaving the other hunter, who has remained 
faithfully at his post cooperating in the stag hunt, what little, if anything, 
remains.  On the other hand, if both hunters agree to set out for hare at the 
outset and both thus defect, each will capture, kill, and eat a hare.192  Thus, 
the order of preferences for each hunter is as follows: (a) both hunt stag, (b) 
both hunt hare, (c) hunt hare while the other hunts stag, and (d) hunt stag 
while the other hunts hare.  In the standard AG game the payoffs take the 
form a > b > c > d,  where a is the cooperative payoff, b is the competitive 
191. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 38 (Jon Elster & Gudmund Hernes
eds., 1987) (defining the relative value of actions and payoffs under the AG); WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 218–22 (1992).  The AG is a “non-zero-sum game” because it enlarges the 
resources available to both players and leaves them with a sum of gains and losses greater than zero. 
192. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY 43 (1755). 
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payoff, c is the payoff to the lone defector, and d is the payoff to the lone 
cooperator. 
b. Standard Payoffs: Assurance Game
As the following payoff matrix for the Stag Hunt AG game illustrates,
the AG payoffs are arbitrarily assigned the values a = 4, b = 3, c = 2, and d 
= 1: 
Assurance Game: Stag Hunt 
Hunter 2 
Hare Stag 
Hunter 1 Hare 3, 3 2, 1Stag 1, 2 4, 4 
c. Analysis: Assurance Game
As the Stag Hunt illustrates, trust is crucial to the AG, as to achieve 
superior payoffs and render mutual cooperation a Nash equilibrium the 
players must work to assure each other that each will choose and continue 
to choose the cooperative but riskier outcome they both prefer, thereby 
rendering the decision to cooperate less risky in direct proportion to the 
degree of assurance against defection each can impress upon the other.193 
Only if each player can be relatively assured that the other will cooperate is 
the mutual cooperation necessary to sustain the AG likely.  In turn, only if 
the players can exchange information that communicates their alignment of 
interests, recognition of the mutual dangers of independent welfare-
maximizing behaviors, and intent to cooperate and continue cooperating, is 
sufficient trust possible.194 
One information exchange regime that is more effective at building 
trust and less prone to the problem of moral hazard than the CI/EE regime 
specifies the formal creation of systematic transparency and the reduction 
of informational asymmetries.  Through the deliberate pooling of research 
and development ventures, the open exchange of technology, and the joint 
communication of plans regarding strategy and pricing, firms can acquire 
193. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and
Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 214, 218–19 (2009) (differentiating the PD from the AG based on payoffs 
and strategies). 
194. See BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, supra note 8, at 38 (specifying the cognitive
understandings that motivate cooperation and collusion between firms). 
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the information they would otherwise have been obliged to seek through 
monitoring activities while obviating, or at least mutually indemnifying 
each other for, the resort to EE.195  This quasi-partnership strategy, 
described by some commentators as “reciprocal altruism”196 and by others 
as outright collusion, affords tangible individual and mutual benefits.197  By 
committing to formalized information exchange, firms, in effect, 
“guarantee” to each other, inter alia, their pricing decisions. 
As a result, each firm receives a benefit each period, including not 
only the supracompetitive profit of  ½C but also an annuity due.  This 
annuity consists of an additional value “Y” that is quantifiable as the sum 
of the absolute values of (1) the cost of CI and all other monitoring 
operations, (2) the costs of EE—direct in the form of expenses and indirect 
in the form of judicial and market-based sanctions, (3) transaction costs 
associated with renegotiating the return to the cooperative equilibrium each 
time defection or a mistaken punishment for perceived defection 
destabilizes the cooperative equilibrium, (4) supracompetitive profits lost 
for at least one period subsequent to the use of a trigger strategy, (5) loss of 
firm value upon public disclosure of the loss of trade secrets, and (6) 
efficiency gains realized through R&D collaboration.198 
d. Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Collusion
The following matrix illustrates the payoffs attendant to Collusion,
where Y is positive, ½(C + Y) is the cooperative payoff, ½(D + Y) is the 
competitive payoff, D -E is the payoff to the lone defector, E is the payoff 
to the lone cooperator, and ½(C + Y) > ½ (D + Y) > D – E > E: 
195.  See Yao, supra note 13, at 324–25 (underscoring the importance of information exchange to
evolution of collaboration). 
196.  “Reciprocal altruism” is a strategy derived from instinctive animal behavior that encourages
both rivals to produce innovations but directs more successful firms to assist less successful firms by 
sharing their gains in order to preserve the viability of the less fortunate in the hope and expectation that 
in the future, should today’s “loser” become tomorrow’s “winner,” the behavior will be reciprocated 
and joint survival ensured.  Id. at 322–323. 
197.  See, e.g., Yun Hsing Cheung, The Economics of Industrial Espionage, 1 INT’L J. BUS. & L.
498 (1995) (arguing that without pooling of duopolists’ resources, CI will have the effect of reducing 
R&D to zero and ultimately causing the profits of both firms to become negative). 
198. Although there is theoretical debate about the degree of market concentration that maximizes
successful R&D outcomes, concentration can increase efficiencies by reducing duplicative efforts, 
enhancing financial stability, and allowing for economies of scale in research.  See, e.g., Michael 
Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2007-08). 
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Assurance Game: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Collusion 
EnHowe 





½(D + Y), ½ (D + 
Y) D – E, E 
High 
Price E, D - E ½ (C + Y), ½ (C + Y) 
Due to the enhanced profitability occasioned by the innovative 
synergies that result from joint research and development as well as the 
reduction in costs elaborated in (1)–(6), both firms earn a premium through 
cooperation and joint profits rise to $12.5 billion,199 while the current and 
future opportunity costs of a return to competition increase accordingly. 
Thus, where (C +Y) = $12.5 billion, (D + Y) = $9.5 billion, C = $10.4 
billion, D = $7 billion, and E = $2.5 billion,200 the joint per-period gain of 
playing AG rather than SSPD is C + Y – D or $6.5 billion,201 while the joint 
per-period value of (1)–(6), Y, realized through switching from the IRPD-
TFT with CI/EE monitoring to the AG, is $2.1 billion. 
e. Analysis: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Collusion
Empirical research indicates that Y—the premium earned from
switching from the IRPD to the AG—is sufficiently valuable that firms are 
willing to abandon monitoring in favor of assurance and even outright 
collusion, so long as their information exchange is symmetric, reciprocal 
and creates a stable, cooperative equilibrium.202  The appointment of a new 
CEO to lead EnHowe and his announcement that DeweyCheatham and 
EnHowe were entering into a joint fuel additives R&D program to improve 
efficiency, reduce duplicative efforts, increase the value of both firms, and 
eliminate EE sent a strong signal to the market, as well as to regulators, that 
in the previous six months the two firms despite or perhaps because of, the 
use of EE and the state’s failure to impose effective sanctions, had 
negotiated an agreement to abandon the IRDP in favor of the AG and 
199. See supra Part III.C. 
200. See generally sources cited supra note 166; see also supra Part III.C.
201. The value of perfect information to each firm in the AG is the difference between the value of
the payoff from the strategy chosen when the “rival’s” decision is certain and the value of the payoff 
from the strategy chosen in the infinitely repeated PD, or profit [D – E]/2 – C/2 = profit [D – E – C]/2. 
See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 150. 
202. See AREEDA, supra note 21, at 29 (finding that firms will exchange “virtually any information”
so long as their informational exchange is symmetric, reciprocal, and in promotion of cooperation). 
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discard the informational exchange regime of CI/EE in favor of formal 
information sharing.  Precisely how the rivals managed to align their 
interests and change course away from destructive competition and trust-
destroying informational conflict and toward collusion and informational 
sharing is uncertain; why they did so requires no more than an examination 
of the payoffs in the AG supra, which were reflected in the share prices of 
both firms. 
As gasoline prices surged upward subsequent to the firms’ 
announcement of their information sharing agreement, questions of how 
and why they had reached this accord became far less important, especially 
to the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, than whether in 
so doing, DeweyCheatham and EnHowe had concluded an express 
agreement as to pricing decisions—a condition precedent sufficient to open 
an antitrust investigation held in abeyance theretofore only by the absence 
of this factual predicate.203 
6. Prosecution: Assurance Game Converted to SSPD with Antitrust
The establishment of tacit collusion is, with nothing more, likely
inadequate to sustain an antitrust prosecution.  Exchanges of information 
between rivals, labeled “facilitating practices,” aid coordination but do not 
by themselves give rise to grounds for prosecution.204  Moreover, based on 
the policy ground that it is in the public interest to avoid wasteful 
redundancy and to promote innovation, firms entering into joint ventures to 
facilitate research and development rather than to fix prices are shielded 
from per se antitrust liability and from treble damages for violations of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provided they inform the Department of 
Justice in advance of their intent to do so.205  However, in application 
203. See supra Part III.A.
204. The Court, in Maple Flooring Manufacturers’ Association v. United States, held that
communication and meetings between rival firms wherein price is discussed do not ipso facto constitute 
unlawful price-fixing absent an express agreement to do so: 
We decide only that trade associations or combinations of person or corporations 
which openly and fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost of their 
product, the volume of production, the actual price which the product has brought in 
past transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost of transportation 
from the principal point of shipment to the points of consumption as did these 
defendants and who, as they did, meet and discuss such information and statistics 
without however reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted 
action with respect to prices or production or restraining competition, do not thereby 
engage in unlawful restraint of commerce. 
268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925).  Precisely what constitutes an agreement or “concerted action” was, however, 
left somewhat indeterminate.  Id.  For a discussion of this indeterminacy, see generally Wiley, supra 
note 32. 
205. See National Cooperative Research and Production Amendments of 1993, 15 U.S.C. § 4301–
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uncertainty remains about the legality of any particular joint venture, and 
firms expressly sharing information enter into new legal terrain and can 
create the rebuttable presumption that their ultimate object is to collude to 
suppress competitive forces.206  With the creation of this presumption 
comes increased state scrutiny, and with increased scrutiny the likelihood 
of prosecution increases proportionally.  Similarly, competitive pricing 
conditions cause consumers and regulators to expect low prices, and when 
prices are restored to supracompetitive levels following the discontinuation 
of competition, antitrust regulators may well be pressured to find grounds 
to investigate and prosecute.207 
Moreover, firms cannot be certain that courts called upon to evaluate 
their liability in regard to facilitating practices and non-express agreements 
will not abandon existing doctrine in favor of earlier conceptions of 
antitrust which considered price-fixing to be inevitable due to the 
disposition “of men to follow their most intelligent competitors, especially 
when powerful, by the inherent disposition to make all the money possible, 
joined with the steady cultivation of the value of ‘harmony’ of action, and 
by the system of reports, which makes the discovery of price reductions 
inevitable and immediate.”208  A future Court could “infer[] from the facts 
which [a]re proved,” that unlawful express price-fixing agreements must 
develop, as the inevitable result human nature, out of facilitating practices 
and tacit agreements regarding prices. 
Men in general are so easily persuaded to do that which will obviously 
prove profitable that the reiterated opinion from the analyst of their 
association, with all obtainable data before him, that higher prices were 
justified and could easily be obtained, must inevitably have resulted, as it 
did result, in concert of action in demanding them.209 
Still, absent evidence of an express agreement, there is generally 
insufficient evidence to convict, and in the case of price-fixing conspiracies 
it is always “significantly easier to secure a conviction when one or more 
members of a conspiracy has confessed.”210 
a. Game Description: Assurance Game Converted to SSPD with Antitrust
To remedy this evidentiary deficiency, the CLP offers both members
of a suspected price cartel leniency in exchange for being the first to 
4303 (2006). 
206. AREEDA, supra note 21, at 29.
207. See generally id. 
208. American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377, 399, 407 (1921). 
209. Id. at 407, 410. 
210. Leslie, Antitrust, Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, supra note 19, at 456. 
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abandon the cartel, confess its existence, and prove evidence to the 
prosecution.  Yet CLP only grants the first confessor amnesty while the 
second confessor remains subject to criminal and civil penalties.  Although 
price cartel members each want to continue earning supracompetitive 
profits, and so long as trust endures and their cartel goes undisturbed they 
can do so, they cannot be certain whether, as regards their particular 
conspiracy, the state has sufficient evidence to convict them.  Thus the 
promise of amnesty for being first to violate the trust of a rival and confess 
the existence of the cartel constitutes a valuable inducement that is 
potentially more valuable than the payoff for continuing a “wait-and-see” 
pattern of cooperation that, while it yields supracompetitive profits, may 
lead to conviction and fines.  Moreover, winning the race to confess is 
more valuable than the payoff for losing.211 
In effect, the CLP creates three possible payoffs in descending order 
of their value: (1) mutual nonconfession, which perpetuates 
supracompetitive profits and precludes private liability for so long as the 
state remains unable to develop evidence independently but carries 
significant risk in inverse proportion to the degree of trust each firm has in 
its fellow cartel member not to confess, while leaving the firm vulnerable 
to its share of criminal and civil fines if the state is able to prosecute 
notwithstanding mutual nonconfession;212 (2) first confession, which 
terminates the cartel, foregoes future supracompetitive profits, and invites 
potential restitution and single damages private liability but immunizes the 
first confessor from criminal fines and treble damages;213 and (3) second 
confession, which occurs after the cartel is already terminated and provides 
no amnesty against conviction, criminal fines, or treble damages, and no 
other party to bear the weight of fines.  Although both firms would prefer 
mutual nonconfession and the perpetuation of supracompetitive profits, to 
the extent that either firm has any ground for not being certain that the 
other will not confess—in other words, if trust is sufficiently eroded—first 
confession becomes more attractive as a strategy.  Furthermore, because 
second confessors do not earn amnesty under the CLP, as soon as one firm 
confesses a second confession becomes irrational, and thus in practice there 
211. Philip C. Zane, The Price Fixer’s Dilemma: Applying Game Theory to the Decision of Whether
to Plead Guilty to Antitrust Crimes, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 3–4 (2003) (analyzing the choices 
available to price-fixing cartel members under the CLP). 
212. Other sources of potential liability—shareholder suits arising from a fall in stock price or the
loss of company assets on the theory that corporate officers violated their fiduciary duty to the firm by 
engaging in price-fixing; criminal and civil liability arising out of violations of securities laws, and 
other potential causes of action—are eliminated from this analysis for purposes of parsimony in 
theoretical development.  For a discussion of these other potential costs that firms may incur by 
confession under the CLP, see id. at 2–3. 
213. See CLP, supra note 76. 
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are only two payoffs—Confess or Silent—with the latter preferable to the 
former and neither a dominant strategy so long as sufficient trust remains. 
If, but only if, the state can exploit ambient distrust such that both firms 
expect to suffer significant penalties as a result of continued participation in 
the cartel does Confess becomes more attractive than Silent and thus the 
dominant strategy, producing an equilibrium of Confess, Confess. 
Thus, by making credible threats through vigorous investigation and 
prosecution of antitrust law generally, scrutiny of suspected price cartel 
members specifically, and encouragement of private party suits for 
damages that render price cartels even less attractive propositions, the state 
can cost-effectively terminate the ongoing AG and (re)create a negative-
sum PD game214 of uncertain but probably short duration in which 
competition is more valuable than cooperation.  Competition is therefore 
rational, and thus, the dominant strategy.  Price cartels will devolve into 
competition with each firm racing to confess before the other.215  Although 
both firms lose, the firm that wins the race to be first to confess loses less 
than its rival in this Single-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma with Antitrust 
(“SSPD-A“), and consumers gain.216 
b. Payoffs: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Prosecution
The following matrix illustrates the SSPD-A where C = $10.4 billion,
D = $7 billion, E = $2.5 billion, Y is $2.1 billion, Z—a factor that 
incorporates the probability and magnitude of fines civil and/or criminal—
is $25 billion, and the payoffs are such that 0 > (E – Z) > [½(D + Y) – 3Z] 
> [½ (C + Y) – 5Z] > D – E – 10Z, and E – Z = -$22.5 billion, [½(D + Y) –
3Z] = –$70.95 billion, [½ (C + Y) – 5Z] = -$118.75 billion, and  D – E –
10Z = –$245.5 billion:
214. To render mutual confession the dominant strategy for each player, the state needs to convert
the strategic interaction into a negative-sum-game, defined as a game in which the sum of gains and 
losses in payoffs for both players is less than zero; in such a game, both players expect to lose in 
relation to their present endowments, and each competes to lose less than the other.  See, e.g., B.D. 
Henderson, The Anatomy of Competition, 47 J. MARKETING 7 (1983). 
215. See Zane, supra note 211, at 2 (analogizing the application of the CLP to price cartels as the
(re)creation of a PD); Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 19, at 519–20 (reporting that the 
CLP has been used to destroy a number of price cartels). 
216. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 6, at 358 (“[A]lthough the . . . equilibrium is bad for the
players, it is actually good for the rest of society” because surplus taken by firms pricing 
supracompetitively is returned to consumers). 
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Single-Shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with Antitrust: DeweyCheatham v. 
EnHowe During Prosecution 
EnHowe 





½(D + Y) – 2.5Z, ½ 
(D + Y) – 2.5Z D – E – 10Z, E – Z 
High 
Price E – Z, D – E – 10Z 
½ (C + Y) – 5Z, ½ (C + 
Y) – 5Z
c. Analysis: DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Prosecution
An analysis of the payoff matrix reveals that given sufficient 
investigative and prosecutorial zeal and the resulting high probability that 
the state will develop the evidence necessary to prosecute even absent a 
confession, trust is destroyed and the payoff is negative no matter whether 
a firm remains silent or confesses.217  In the negative-sum game with the 
dominant strategy and equilibrium Confess, Confess, the objective 
becomes merely to outcompete the other player in loss mitigation, and as a 
consequence, the firms race to win the best possible payoff of E – Z, or –
$22.5 billion.  Whether achieved by chance, a more accurate assessment of 
the probability of prosecution than EnHowe, motivation for revenge after 
EnHowe’s EE attack, clandestine communications with prosecutors, or 
some combination of these factors, DeweyCheatham, by winning the race 
to confess the existence of the cartel under the CLP, minimized its losses 
while foisting the far larger share of the cost of cartel membership onto 
EnHowe.  The big winners, however, were consumers.  Fines of $25 billion 
(Z) on DeweyCheatham and $250 billion (10Z) on EnHowe not only
returned all supracompetitive profits of approximately $50 billion earned
between late 2012 and early 2015 to consumers, but also subsidized their
purchases past and present while stimulating the economy through
increased consumer demand.  Moreover, successful destruction of the
gasoline price cartel restored competitive prices, and may well provide
deterrence against future cartelization in the petrochemical industry as well
as others.218  Despite the additional value of the intellectual property each
217. The penalty for each firm during mutual confession—5Z—is greater than the penalty for
mutual silence—2.5Z—based on the arbitrary determination that the likelihood of successful 
prosecution doubles as a result of the assistance given to the prosecutors by the first confessor under the 
CLP.  “Z” is calculated as the actual lost consumer surplus occasioned by cartel pricing. 
218. Evidence suggests that prosecution of price cartels has a deterrent effect on future cartel
formation.  See, e.g., Michael K. Block, Frederick C. Nold, & Joseph G. Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of 
 354 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:2 
firm added to its product, little if any of this innovation resulted in producer 
surplus as prices fell through competition.  Whether the jaundiced eye of 
antitrust prosecutors would have been directed toward the two firms in the 
first place had DeweyCheatham not pursued criminal sanctions against 
EnHowe for its EE attack can never be known; had the two firms 
developed greater trust or evolved toward an assurance game more quickly, 
each might have been able to claim the benefits of cooperation without the 
costs of state intervention. 
In sum, with information exchange between DeweyCheatham and 
EnHowe corrupted by the specter of prosecution and the need to employ 
strategic deception in order to earn amnesty as the first confessor under the 
CLP, commitment to the collusive relationship and the trust necessary to 
sustain it disintegrated, and with it any possibility of cooperation.  With 
cooperation so unattractive to and expensive for players, the competitive 
outcome became the new equilibrium of a negative-sum game. 
Accordingly, the strategic interaction between the two firms subsequent to 
Phase Six: Prosecution devolved to competition, with future periods and 
future payoffs modeled by the Single-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe During Competition presented supra. 
D. DISCUSSION
1. Questions Answered
Game-theoretic analysis of the hypothetical scenario of
DeweyCheatham v. EnHowe, which was developed to illustrate an 
evolutionary pre-theory that postulates trust as essential to the evolution 
and devolution of price cartels and information exchange as crucial in the 
creation and destruction of trust, illustrates that rational, self-interested 
firms will engage in strategic interactions with rivals ranging from vigorous 
competition to virtual merger, and it suggests answers to the questions 
begged by the experience of the angry motorist in Utopia. 
It is affirmatively legal to charge a premium above the competitive 
price.  However, it is unlawful to do so as the result of an express 
agreement to fix the price at a supracompetitive level.  To the question of 
how firms are able to charge supracompetitive prices without entering into 
express agreements to do so, the answer is relatively straightforward: It is 
Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429 (1981).  Other research concludes that even if cartel 
formation is not deterred, prosecution has the effect of reducing the prices cartels can charge in the 
future.  See, e.g., Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program 
on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 7–8 (Vivek 
Ghozal & Johan Stennek eds., 2006) (CLP reduces prices even if cartel formation is undeterred). 
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in their rational self-interest, and the only impediment to achieving a stable 
supracompetitive price equilibrium is uncertainty about the prices rivals 
will charge.  Initial spontaneous and cooperative pricing decisions, 
motivated by the struggle for survival and conditioned by an innate human 
propensity to cooperate when individual and mutual welfare maximization 
require it, are reciprocated leading to the development of trust and the 
achievement of a Pareto-optimal cooperative equilibrium in which both 
firms achieve high profits without any express agreement to do so.  Each 
receives and understands the supracompetitive pricing decision of its rival 
as an information exchange that communicates a recognition of the benefits 
of and a desire for cooperation.  Reciprocity communicates and reinforces 
trust.  As trust builds, the evolutionary stability of cooperation increases. 
Moreover, as the analysis suggests, firms arrive at the identical 
supracompetitive price even without reaching any express agreement 
because they employ monitoring to facilitate the exchange of information 
about the past, present, and future pricing decisions of their rivals.  When 
prices are not completely or immediately transparent, firms seek to acquire 
information about the pricing decisions of their rivals, and so long as the 
methods, means, and scope employed are consistent with the tacit 
understandings that develop as regards the boundaries of the permissible, 
monitoring reinforces trust, and duopolists in price cartels adjust their 
prices in order to optimize profits and achieve a mutually satisfactory and 
beneficial allocation of the markets.  Because a firm that lowered its prices 
would communicate its abandonment of cooperation, damage trust, and 
sacrifice the long-term benefits of cooperation, which are more valuable 
than the short-term benefits of pricing competitively, neither firm, once 
cooperation is established and stable, lowers its price.  If either firm priced 
competitively in an attempt to increase its market share, the result would be 
that its rival would cut prices in response and each firm would sacrifice 
profits, with consumers the only beneficiaries of competition. 
To some extent, supracompetitive pricing can be remedied through 
law, but where supracompetitive pricing does not result from express 
agreements to fix prices there is little antitrust law can do to suppress it—at 
least directly.  Parallel behavior and supracompetitive prices taken together 
are almost certainly insufficient to trigger antitrust prosecution without an 
express agreement to fix prices.219  However, this does not suggest antitrust 
law is merely interstitial, that consumers, legislatures, regulators, and 
prosecutors are not part of the optimal solution to the failure of competitive 
markets, or that there are no rules, processes, or instrumentalities that the 
state or consumers can wield by way of a remedy.  In fact, as the preceding 
219. See sources cited supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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analysis underscores, strategic non-enforcement of the Economic 
Espionage Act and the lure of the Corporate Leniency Program, as well 
perhaps as other tools and procedures, can trigger a chain of events that 
disrupts and corrupts inter-firm exchanges of information, undermines trust 
between firms, promotes the devolution of cooperation, destroys cartels, 
enhances social welfare, and thereby promotes the end of the antitrust 




Game-theoretic analysis of the strategic interaction between
DeweyCheatham and EnHowe reveals that the payoffs available are 
partially determined by whether and to what extent the state intervenes in 
the “games” being played by the two firms.220  Through the creation, 
interpretation, and adjudication of antitrust law, the state makes the “meta-
rules” that govern whether and to what extent cooperation is possible and 
how costly are any penalties associated with cooperation.  Although the 
state is often an “unseen third force,”221 the capacity to alter payoffs and 
even eliminate cooperative equilibrium is an important tool in the antitrust 
arsenal that, if used strategically might yield the result that antitrust law 
need not be as feeble an instrument against price cartels as an examination 
of the relevant caselaw might suggest.222  While of its own accord, antitrust 
law may muster insufficient deterrent force through the probability and 
severity of sanctions to suppress parallel supracompetitive pricing when 
evidence of an express agreement to fix prices is unavailable.  The state, by 
destabilizing the exchange of information between firms, can foster and 
intensify distrust, degrade and destroy the benefits of cooperation, and 
force the devolution of the strategic interaction between firms toward 
competition.223  The objectives of antitrust law—deterring and defeating 
price cartels—can thus be secured not solely through the creation, 
220. Whether, how, and to what extent the state intervenes in the strategic interaction between
cooperating firms is in part a function of antitrust law and in part a function of social, economic, and 
political pressures.  For a discussion of the politico-economic variables that influence how state 
obligations to enforce law are interpreted and discharged, see Napatoff, infra note 224. 
221. Yao, supra note 13, at 337.
222. See sources cited supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
223. Theoretically, with the right rules and sanctions, antitrust law could prevent price cartels based
on tacit agreements without recourse to underenforcement or mechanisms such as CLP.  See 
Alemandares & Landa, supra note 132, at 527 (“[W]ith the right sanctions any law would be an 
equilibrium and thus a solution to a . . . problem.”). 
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interpretation, and application of antitrust law but by the identification and 
exploitation of opportunities to check the information exchange that is 
essential to creating and sustaining trust, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for 
cooperation.  Through a complementary and opportunistic approach to 
antitrust that focuses on rendering communication between firms more 
opaque and more costly, the state can leverage the inherent compliance pull 
of antitrust law, and thereby enhance its power to deter and defeat 
supracompetitive pricing.  Two opportunities to implement this strategy—
underenforcement of the EEA, and the use of the CLP—are suggested by 
the preceding analysis.  The use of the latter to exploit distrust and 
undermine cooperation is detailed supra; an examination of the former 
requires a brief introduction to underenforcement theory (“UT”). 
UT postulates that the deliberate underenforcement of a law is a socio-
legal phenomenon that occurs in three circumstances: (1) when a criminal 
law is so overbroad that neither legislators, regulators, nor citizens expect 
or demand full enforcement by police and prosecutors, in whom they have 
tacitly invested discretion to narrow the law in practice;224 (2) when a state 
is too politically weak or resource poor to undertake full enforcement of a 
rule that otherwise enjoys a broad moral and political consensus;225 and (3) 
when dictated by sufficiently widespread normative commitments to values 
not yet enshrined in formal law, and the pragmatic state resolves the 
dilemma by fashioning a compromise that “satisfies majoritarian 
preferences by enacting, at low cost, a formal prohibition” and also 
“satisfies minoritarian preferences by adopting a weak enforcement 
strategy.”226  Although there is disagreement as to whether unenforced laws 
remain legally binding or whether under-enforcement modifies not only the 
224. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1717, 1745 (2011).  Some
commentators suggest that antitrust laws in general fit into this conceptual category.  See generally 
Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the Deck 
Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 159 (2008) (developing this argument); see also Devlin 
& Jacobs, supra note 31. 
225. Natapoff, supra note 224, at 1717–18.  An example of weak state underenforcement might be
maximum speed limits on highways, laws prohibiting prostitution or drugs, and income tax laws.  See, 
e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 440
(2002).
226. Barnett, supra note 225, at 439. Other UT scholars describe underenforcement as a pragmatic
political strategy by a state in transition or in political conflict.  See Napatoff, supra note 224, at 1720–
21 (suggesting that “full enforcement of the law may not always be desirable from a democratic or 
distributive perspective”); id. at 1741–42 (noting that “the political process of allocating the valuable 
resource of law enforcement can be a useful and appropriate vehicle for mediating . . . competing, 
highly contested claims” and that “underenforcement is a combination of public value judgments, 
resource allocations, [and political] choices . . . .”).  Examples of normatively driven underenforcement 
are the refusal to prosecute members of the Civil Rights Movement or illegal immigrants for technical 
violations of criminal laws.  See id. at 1724–25 (discussing examples). 
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law-in-action but also the law-on-the books,227 under-enforcement 
decisions are perceived as positive or negative by various constituencies 
depending upon conceptions of self-interest, the degree to which 
underenforcement destabilizes settled understandings of proscribed and 
prescribed conduct, and the degree to which under-enforcement 
undermines respect for law more generally;228 decisions broadly supported 
are termed “constructive under-enforcement.” 
Violation of intellectual property rights is a frequently discussed 
example of constructive under-enforcement based on normative 
commitments to values inconsistent with formal legal regimes.  Violations 
of IP rights abound in cyberspace—the “single largest location of 
violations of intellectual property precepts of any place in human 
history”229—and elsewhere, and under-enforcement is described as 
constructive on grounds that it “enhances creativity and the development of 
new technologies”230 and is a pragmatic and democratic response to 
“competing, legitimate claims” of non-rights-holders over how rights in 
intellectual property should be allocated.231  More general proposals for 
broader public disclosure of information would have the effect of revealing 
trade secrets, yet considerations of competitive harm that might be inflicted 
on disclosing firms are dismissed as unlikely or insufficient to merit 
concern.232  Weak enforcement of intellectual property rights is thus 
227. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 583, 588 (2011) (maintaining that underenforcement decisions are case-specific and do not
alter the legally binding character of the underlying rule); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004).
228. See Barnett, supra note 225, at 424–25 (explaining that underenforcement can erode the
capacity to know what conduct is permitted and prohibited, undermine compliance, and leave the 
objects of the law in question “unsure whether . . . proscribed conduct or close substitutes are strictly 
illegal, de facto legal, always legal under certain circumstances, or sometimes legal under certain 
circumstances.”).   See also Natapoff, supra note 224, at 1720–21 (allowing that underenforcement can 
become problematic but only “when it weakens broader values of public protection, official 
evenhandedness, respect for the law, and democratic responsiveness.”). 
229. Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 343 (2000). 
230. Natapoff, supra note 224, at 1751.  This claim is very much contested, including by those
entrusted with enforcing intellectual property laws: the U.S. Department of Justice, in announcing 
prosecutions of EEA cases, has often issued press releases contending that “[t]he vigorous enforcement 
of intellectual property statutes increases . . . economic vitality . . . .”  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Two Bay Area Men Indicted On Charges of Economic Espionage (Sept. 26, 2007) (available at 
http://www.cybercrime.gov//liIndict.htm.). 
231. Natapoff, supra note 224, at 1741. 
232. A series of corporate scandals that destroyed $1 trillion in shareholder value, eliminated
millions of jobs, and felled corporate giants sparked widespread distrust and prompted Congress to 
enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in 2002, which requires disclosure on a “rapid and current basis 
such additional information . . . [as] is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the 
public interest.”   Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–24, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  Several 
commentators, recognizing in the market failure SOX was crafted to remedy an opportunity to revisit 
the question of how much information public firms should be obligated to disclose, have suggested that 
additional disclosures, to include information colorable as trade secrets, would further enhance social 
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understood by UT as a stimulant to innovation, an inducement to 
competitive pricing, and an enhancement of social welfare.233 
Underenforcement of intellectual property intersects with antitrust 
when firms, in the process of acquiring information about rivals’ pricing 
decisions, venture into EE, prompting targeted firms to seek remedies from 
the state under the EEA.  Deliberate underenforcement of the EEA, 
whether through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to decline a case or 
by affording remedies that do not compensate targeted firms, promotes 
firms’ violation of shared understandings as to the boundaries of the 
permissible in the monitoring of pricing decisions, erodes trust, and renders 
cooperation more costly.  Although the question of a price cartel earning 
supracompetitive profits is not part of the gravamen of an EEA 
prosecution, prosecutors and courts called upon to afford a remedy to an 
welfare by diffusing innovations, increasing competition, and reducing prices.  See Guttentag, supra 
note 31, at 130 (contending that, to enhance social welfare, public firms should be required to disclose 
additional quantitative and qualitative measures of financial performance, customer relationships, and 
other competitively sensitive aspects of firm operations and plans); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The 
Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: 
“Are We There Yet?”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 140–58 (1998) (arguing that restrictions on the public 
disclosures firms are obligated to make can lead to “market failures”).  Many firms contend that further 
required disclosures would benefit their rivals, thereby reducing incentives to invest in innovation.  See, 
e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT
(1969).  Some commentators, however, suggest that under current disclosure requirements firms do not
capture all the value of their intellectual property and that the socially optimal level of disclosure
required by additional legislation would better allocate resources, reduce market concentration, and
facilitate competition.  See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 31, at 139–48 (noting that firms fail to capture
all the value of their intellectual property and describing how disclosures reduce monopoly power and
increase social welfare); see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 21–29 (3d ed., 1990).  While information that might be classified as
trade secrets is not currently subject to disclosure on the ground that to require it would inflict
“competitive harm,” commentators who regard this argument as “highly suspect” may recognize in
underenforcement of the EEA an indirect opportunity to elicit information regarding trade secrets from
firms targeted by EE.
233. Trade secrets, along with other forms of intellectual property, have long enjoyed common law
and statutory protection on the theory that it is to “the advantage of the public . . . to encourage and 
protect invention and commercial enterprise . . . .”  Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457 (1868).  
Trade secret protection “has always been about generating incentives to create.”  Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005).  However, the 
grant of legal protection of unlimited duration to secret information, although it benefits the rights 
holder, deprives the general public, relevant scientific and creative communities, and rivals from ever 
accessing this information, with the result that the rights holder enjoys a time-unlimited monopoly over 
goods or services created from this information that diminishes social welfare.  Accordingly, UT 
suggests that trade secret protection be attenuated to better allocate the benefits of innovation and 
enhance social welfare, and empirical evidence that federal law enforcement efforts deprioritize 
protection of trade secrets in favor of forms of intellectual property that secure rights for only a limited 
time period may well be evidence of tacit governmental acknowledgment that trade secrets protection is 
inherently anticompetitive.  See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 59, at 479 (comparing federal protection of 
various forms of intellectual property rights).  For a discussion of the origin and history of trade secret 
protection in the U.S., see generally Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in 
Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 243(1998). 
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aggrieved firm are presented, in effect, with an opportunity to adjust the 
payoffs in the strategic game between the accused and the aggrieved firm 
in a manner that further erodes trust, and with it, cooperation.234  Thus, 
when a conflict over the process and scope of information exchange 
between rivals gives rise to an EEA action, the state, with consumer 
welfare on its agenda, is handed the chance to calibrate, albeit indirectly, 
the degree of competitiveness in the corner of the market occupied by the 
victim and defendant firms.  Deliberately weak enforcement of the EEA 
denies aggrieved firms an effective public remedy235 and forces them to 
resort to self-help methods—improving their own CE operations and, most 
importantly from the perspective of the state, punishing defections through 
TFT or other trigger strategies that match or undercut rivals’ prices. 
Moreover, failing to impose serious punishment on firms that steal trade 
secrets has the effect of diffusing innovation by condoning cost-free 
imitation, further enhancing social welfare.  In effect, deliberate 
underenforcement of the EEA can be a valuable strategy to augment 
antitrust law and achieve its ends, albeit indirectly, because EE, along with 
any other methods of acquiring information proscribed by the tacit regime 
developed between rival firms, promotes uncertainty, increases competition 
and innovation, and reduces prices. 
b. Firms
As rational actors, firms wish to attain and preserve the survival
benefits of supracompetitive pricing and profits, but to do so they must 
make strategic decisions that protect cooperation against devolution. 
Because the gains to the individual firm from defection are small relative to 
the long-term gains from cooperation, the interests of firms are almost 
invariably in opposition to those of the state, with the state dedicated to 
competition and consumer surplus and firms seeking to preserve 
234.  Scholars of game theory have not yet developed much theoretical insight into the process
whereby courts reinforce competitive policy preferences in the absence of an explicit cartel agreement.  
See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 165 (stating that it is “[un]clear how [antitrust laws] affect 
tacit agreements which come into being when firms increase prices without actually entering into an 
explicit bargain”).  Some suggest that, because the mere existence of collusion without evidence of 
conspiracy is insufficient to support a conviction, courts are simply powerless to suppress this behavior 
under existing law.  Empirical evidence of post-1996 adjudication of cases brought under the EEA 
suggests otherwise, however.  See Ghosh, supra note 61, at 27–32. 
235.  The average penalty imposed upon conviction under the EEA is almost trivial.  See  generally
Carr et al., supra note 56 (reporting that fines levied in EEA cases typically are less than 0.1% of the 
value of the stolen trade secrets).  Thus, if C is the average monthly profit for a cartel duopolist whose 
theft of trade secrets is analogous to charging low price against its rival’s high price, and it is assumed 
that the penalty for conviction of an EEA violation is absorbed in the first period following conviction, 
the penalty = .001C. 
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cooperation in order to claim producer surplus.  Consequently, firms must 
guard against the intrusion of the state and its power to trump into their 
strategic interaction.  To achieve this, the preceding game-theoretic 
analysis counsels firms to be careful in the protection of the trust that is 
essential for the evolution and preservation of cooperation.  While 
information exchange is necessary to initiate, grow, and sustain trust, 
agreements as to the permissible means, methods, and scope regarding the 
collection of information about rivals should be honored and EE eschewed 
lest violations provide the impetus to defections that prove costly to both 
firms, whether through the imposition of punishment by a rival playing a 
trigger strategy, penalties imposed by the state or the markets upon resort to 
EEA prosecution, penalties imposed by the state under antitrust laws, 
and/or opportunity costs suffered through the devolution of cooperation. 
Moreover, upon transgressions regarding information exchange, firms are 
better off conducting private negotiations that afford remedies that allow 
for the reestablishment of the cooperative equilibrium as swiftly and as 
quietly as possible.  Allowing the state entry into the dispute diminishes the 
value of both firms, precludes remedies that would make aggrieved firms 
whole, and increases regulatory scrutiny that might well pave a path toward 
antitrust investigation and prosecution.  Keeping the state out of the game 
and honoring agreements, tacit or express, supports trust, cooperation, and 
maximizes the welfare and survival of price cartels, and therefore, must be 
the twin imperatives of firms seeking to achieve and preserve 
supracompetitive pricing and profits. 
E. PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESES
The following statements are proposed as preliminary hypotheses
(“PHs”): 
The more a firm cooperates with its rival, the more likely it is to 
survive; 
The more a firm cooperates with its rival, the greater its profits; 
The more a firm trusts that its rival will reciprocate a cooperative 
pricing decision, the more likely it is to initiate cooperation in its pricing 
decisions; 
The more a firm trusts that its rival will reciprocate a cooperative 
pricing decision, the more likely it is to reciprocate initial cooperation in its 
pricing decision; 
The more a firm trusts that its rival will reciprocate a cooperative 
pricing decision, the more likely it is to sustain cooperation in its pricing 
decisions; 
The longer cooperation is reciprocated, the greater the trust between 
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cooperating firms; 
The longer cooperation is unreciprocated, the less the trust between 
competing firms; 
The greater the long-term benefits of cooperation relative to the short-
term gains of competition, the more likely a firm will cooperate in its 
pricing decisions; 
The greater the long-term benefits of cooperation relative to the short-
term gains of competition, the more likely a firm will adhere to tacit 
agreements regarding the permissible means, methods, and scope for the 
acquisition and transmission of information regarding pricing decisions; 
The more firms adhere to tacit agreements regarding the permissible 
means, methods, and scope of the acquisition and transmission of 
information regarding pricing decisions, the greater the trust between firms 
that cooperative pricing decisions will be reciprocated; 
The less the EEA is enforced, the greater the expected benefits of 
trade secret misappropriation, and the less likely firms will be to adhere to 
tacit agreements regarding the permissible means, methods, and scope for 
the acquisition and transmission of information regarding price decisions; 
The less the EEA is enforced, the less the trust between firms that 
cooperative pricing decisions will be reciprocated; 
The less the EEA is enforced, the more likely firms will be to make 
competitive pricing decisions; 
The less a firm trusts that its rival will reciprocate its cooperative 
pricing decisions, the more likely it will be to seek and enter into express 
price-fixing agreements; 
The greater the risk of antitrust prosecution, the less likely a firm will 
be to adhere to tacit agreements regarding the permissible means, methods, 
and scope of the acquisition and transmission of information regarding 
pricing decisions; 
The greater the risk of antitrust prosecution; the less likely firms will 
trust that cooperative pricing decisions will be reciprocated; 
The greater the risk of antitrust prosecution, the more likely firms will 
be to make competitive pricing decisions; 
The more likely that the state will grant amnesty to the first firm to 
confess the existence of a price cartel, the greater the risk of antitrust 
prosecution; 
The more likely it is that the state will grant amnesty to the first firm 
to confess the existence of a price cartel, the more likely firms will be to 
make competitive pricing decisions; and 
The more likely firms are to make competitive pricing decisions, the 
more likely their strategic interaction will be to devolve toward 
competition. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Heretofore, game theory has assisted researchers in explaining and
predicting how firms compete in markets under various conditions using 
various assumptions about strategic choices, information, rules, and 
temporal dimensions.  However, in regard to the economics of antitrust 
law, “game theory is barely visible[,]”236 in part because of the difficulties 
in applying the method to permit ready and accurate differentiation of 
avoidable and unambiguously anticompetitive conduct from conduct that is 
rational based on interdependence and sound business practices.237  Game 
theory has proven useful in identifying patterns of competition and conflict 
between duopolists and in suggesting variables that render cooperation 
more or less likely, but it “has yet to yield compelling mechanistic 
solutions” or predictions to the problem of price cartels.238  Its use to 
develop and test a theory of the evolution and devolution of price cartels is 
part of a broader project.  More methodological and substantive research is 
needed to validate and improve the use of game theory as a heuristic to 
develop and test theories in the field of antitrust law in general, and the 
proffered theory of the evolution and devolution of price cartels in 
particular.  Nevertheless, game theory has aided in the specification of 
working hypotheses regarding the relationship between firms’ pricing 
decisions and their expected payoffs, as well as in answering questions 
regarding whether and how the state can intervene in cartelized markets to 
preserve and restore competitive pricing on behalf of consumers. 
Specifically, price cartels generate supracompetitive prices and profits 
that aid firms in their struggle for survival even as they reduce social 
welfare.  Rational firms seek to form price cartels, yet trust that rivals will 
reciprocate cooperative pricing decisions is essential to a firm’s evolution 
and devolution, and information exchange is necessary to create and 
destroy trust.  Even as they avoid the express agreements to fix prices that 
would create antitrust liability, firms, by exchanging information regarding 
their interest in and intention to initiate and reciprocate cooperation in their 
pricing decisions, can generate sufficient trust that price cartels can evolve 
and endure.  So long as the methods, means, and scope of information 
exchange reinforce trust, the long-term benefits of cooperation exceed the 
short-term benefits of competition, and cooperation is a stable strategy.  For 
236. Peritz, supra note 154, at 112. 
237. See Kobayashi, supra note 141, at 415 (describing the limitation of game theory as applied to
antitrust analysis). 
238. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 232, at 220. 
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the state, and for the consumers whose interests the state represents, the key 
to the devolution of price cartels is thus interference with that information 
exchange in a manner that erodes trust, destabilizes cooperation, and 
renders competition more valuable, and more rational, to firms. 
Although antitrust law has not been crafted or interpreted to allow for 
the extinguishing of price cartels that form and endure without express 
agreements to fix prices, the state is not without instrumentalities that, 
wielded strategically, can force the devolution of price cartels.  Strategic 
nonenforcement of the Economic Espionage Act and the enticement to 
abandon cooperation in exchange for amnesty offered through the 
Corporate Leniency Program are but two mechanisms whereby the state 
can disrupt inter-firm exchanges of information, undermine inter-firm trust, 
promote the devolution of cooperation, destroy cartels, and enhance social 
welfare.  How to leverage these mechanisms further, and whether other 
modifications to the process of creating, interpreting, adjudicating, and 
reinforcing antitrust law can help promote social welfare, await future 
research.239 
239. Recent scholarship suggests one such reinforcing mechanism: that statutes be modified to
permit information acquired in the context of evaluating proposed mergers and acquisitions to be used 
in investigating and prosecuting price cartels.  See Vivek Ghosal, The Law and Economics of 
Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information from Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute 
Cartels, SSRN.COM (June 17, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866543.  For discussion of trends 
converging upon the criminalization of price cartels transnationally, see Gregory C. Shaffer & 
Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 313, 313 (2011). 
